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Abstract 
 
Is aid contributing to poverty reduction? 
An analysis of the poverty-efficiency of Norwegian aid 
by 
Arnhild Margrethe Linstad, Master in Economics 
University of Bergen, 2013 
Supervisor: Rune Jansen Hagen 
This master thesis aims at assessing the poverty-efficiency of the current Norwegian aid 
allocation. Is Norwegian aid allocated in a way that has the maximum impact on poverty 
reduction? I use panel regression and a model developed by Collier & Dollar (2002) to 
construct a poverty-efficient allocation of aid across countries. This is how aid would be 
allocated if the sole purpose of donors was to maximize poverty reduction. I thereafter 
compare the optimal allocation to the current allocation of aid, and in particular to the 
Norwegian allocation, and I find large discrepancies between them. This can partly be 
ascribed to a large number of recipient countries. In the poverty-efficient allocation only 32 
countries are found to be eligible for aid receipts. Concentrating aid to fewer recipients would 
increase the poverty-efficiency of the current allocation. I also find that the current Norwegian 
allocation of aid is considerably less in line with the poverty-efficient allocation than that of 
the average donor, the rank correlations between them are 0.42 and 0.63, respectively. I 
believe that the recent integration of environmental and foreign policy with aid is partly 
responsible for the results. Brazil is today the largest recipient of Norwegian aid, and the share 
of the aid budget pertaining to least developed countries is declining. There appears to be a 
trade-off between allocating aid for poverty reduction and playing a leading role in the areas 
of forest preservation and conflict prevention, which are increasingly prioritized sectors in the 
Norwegian aid budget. Had considerations of future poverty reduction been taken into 
account in the model, Norwegian aid might have been evaluated as more poverty-efficient 
than is the case in this analysis. Estimations and calculations are made using StataSE 11 and 
the poverty-efficient allocation is constructed in Excel 2007. 
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1 Introduction 
In this master thesis I examine Norway’s allocation of foreign aid the past decades and make 
an assessment of its current potential impact on poverty reduction. The World Bank report 
Assessing Aid from 1998 and the subsequent journal articles by Burnside & Dollar (2000) and 
Collier & Dollar (2001a, 2002) have been hugely influential in the policy arena regarding this 
topic. They single out two important criteria for poverty-efficient aid allocation, and argue 
that in order for countries to be eligible for aid receipts they should possess at least one and 
preferably both of the following characteristics: a large share of the population living in 
poverty, and sound economic policies.  
Norway has a reputation for emphasizing recipient needs and for allocating a large share of its 
aid budget to low income countries, in addition to rewarding good governance. In the latest 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Peer Review
1
 from 2008, Norway is considered a 
frontrunner when it comes to generosity, aid allocation decisions and aid effectiveness 
(Patrick and Taylor 2009). However, the past couple of years the country has also been 
criticized for its aid allocations. According to Easterly & Williamson (2011) Norway to a 
large degree ignores corruption and undemocratic practices and fails at targeting the poorest 
countries when allocating aid. Is there a basis for this criticism?  
In 2001, Paul Collier and David Dollar from the World Bank made an assessment of 
Norwegian aid and its efficiency in reducing poverty, using a so-called poverty-efficient 
allocation of aid as their benchmark and comparing it to Norway’s allocation. Norwegian aid 
was in fact found to be more efficient in reducing poverty than aid from the average ODA 
donor. However there was also identified a scope for improvement (Collier & Dollar, 2001b). 
In this thesis I make a similar econometric analysis as Collier & Dollar (2002), using more 
recent data to find out to what extent the current Norwegian aid is allocated in a poverty-
efficient way. This includes running panel regressions to establish the marginal effect of aid 
on economic growth and constructing a poverty-efficient allocation of aid based on this. This 
allocation will then be compared to the current allocation of aid, and in particular to the 
Norwegian allocation.  
 
                                                 
1“ Each DAC member country is peer reviewed roughly every four years with two main aims: to help the country 
understand where it could improve its development strategy and structures so that it can increase the 
effectiveness of its investment; and to identify and share good practice in development policy and strategy.” 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/peerreviewsofdacmembers/ 
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1.1 Background 
The background for my choice of topic is that I find aid allocation decisions compelling, and 
would like to look into Norway’s policy in this area. The recent criticism by several authors 
makes it even more interesting to take a closer look at these issues. Major changes in thematic 
and geographic priorities have occurred in the Norwegian aid portfolio the last decade. There 
has also been an increasing overlap between foreign policy and development policy. How 
efficient is Norwegian aid in contributing to its main aim; poverty reduction? Is this still the 
main aim when allocating aid, or have other considerations overtaken the development agenda 
in Norway?  
 
1.2 Research questions 
I will be looking at the following questions: 
i) To what extent is Norwegian aid allocated in line with the poverty-efficient 
allocation? 
ii) What has happened to the poverty-efficiency of Norwegian aid in the past decade, 
and what are the reasons for this development? 
iii) Has the increased integration of foreign policy and development aid weakened the 
poverty-efficiency of Norwegian aid?  
 
My hypothesis is that Norwegian aid has in fact become less efficient in reducing poverty 
during the last decade, and I believe that this is directly related to question iii). I assume that 
foreign policy to a large degree has had influence on Norwegian aid allocation since 2001. 
One consequence of this is that a large portion of the country’s aid budget is now allocated to 
rainforest preservation projects around the world, and in particular Brazil, a large middle 
income country. In addition to this, Norway takes on the role as a peace nation, accompanied 
by quite large aid disbursements being devoted to conflict resolution and prevention. These 
are noble causes, however may not be very effective at reducing poverty in the short run and 
within the framework of the model used.  
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1.3 Structure of thesis 
The rest of the thesis is organized in the following way.  In chapter 2 I define some of the key 
terms that will be recurrent in the rest of the thesis. Chapter 3 gives a brief overview of the 
history of Norway’s foreign aid policy and how the focus on poverty reduction has changed 
throughout the past four decades. Here I also take a look at recent developments in Norwegian 
aid disbursements across sectors and country income groupings. The model used for 
constructing the poverty-efficient allocation of aid is presented in chapter 4, followed by a 
literature review in chapter 5, which in particular discusses empirical findings related to the 
underlying assumptions of the model. Chapter 6 gives a presentation of my data, and 
estimation method and regression results follow in chapter 7 and 8. The poverty-efficient 
allocation of aid is constructed in chapter 9, where I comment on the changes that have 
occurred in the Norwegian aid portfolio and its poverty-efficiency since Collier & Dollar’s 
evaluation in 2001. Chapter 10 concludes and wraps up the findings. 
 
2 Definitions of key terms 
4 
 
2 Definitions of key terms 
In this chapter I define and explain the key terms that will be recurrent throughout the thesis. 
These are official development assistance (ODA), poverty, poverty reduction and poverty-
efficient allocation of aid. 
 
2.1 Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
In the OECD-DAC Glossary of Key Terms and Concepts, Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) is defined as 
”Grants or loans to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA 
Recipients (developing countries) and to multilateral agencies which are: (a) 
undertaken by the official sector; (b) with promotion of economic development 
and welfare as the main objective; (c) at concessional financial terms (if 
a loan, having a grant element of at least 25 per cent). In addition to financial 
flows, technical co-operation is included in aid. Grants, loans and credits for 
military purposes are excluded.” (OECD, 2012a)  
 
ODA thereby includes official bilateral and multilateral transfers that are grants or 
concessional loans provided for developmental purposes. Lending by export credit agencies, 
with the sole purpose of promoting their own exports, is excluded (International Monetary 
Fund, 2003). There is nothing wrong with export promotion lending per se, but it is not 
included in aid statistics because of its lack of a grant element and the fact that it is done with 
the purpose of benefiting the lending country, not the developing one. Tied aid
2
 is included, 
and this kind of practice is still common among several donors.  
One important implication of this definition is that financial assistance, although with grant 
elements, given to some Eastern European countries (so-called part II countries) is not defined 
as ODA. This assistance is defined as Official Aid, and was recorded until 2004. As a 
consequence of this some of the countries in Collier & Dollar’s analysis are not included in 
mine. 
                                                 
2
  The OECD defines tied aid as “official grants or loans where procurement of the goods or services involved is limited 
to the donor country or to a group of countries which does not include substantially all aid recipient countries” (OECD, 
2012a). http://www.oecd.org/dac/aidstatistics/43544160.pdf 
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ODA flows can be measured at the time that they are firmly agreed (commitments) or at the 
time of the actual international transfer of money to the recipient country (disbursements). 
Disbursements can further be measured gross or net. Gross includes the full amount of 
transfers to the recipient in a given period, while the net amount is deducted of repayment of 
loans in the same period (OECD, 2008). The standard measure of donor effort is net 
disbursements, and this is also the data I use in my analysis. In the rest of the thesis I will be 
using the terms ODA and aid interchangeably. 
 
2.2 Poverty  
Poverty is a concept with many possible definitions. The definition that will be applied 
throughout this thesis is that of absolute poverty. This refers to people living without access to 
a defined minimum of resources necessary for covering basic needs like food and shelter. The 
measures of absolute poverty are related to the $1.25 or $2 a day poverty lines.  
The $1.25 poverty headcount ratio is defined as “the percentage of the population living on 
less than $1.25 a day at 2005 international prices” (The World Bank Group, 2012). The $2 
poverty line has a corresponding definition. The measures are adjusted for purchasing power 
parity, which means that they account for all people living on less than the equivalent of $1.25 
or $2 a day in the United States.  
The poverty gap index is a more comprehensive measure, which also takes into account the 
depth of poverty, not just its incidence. This is defined as “the mean shortfall from the poverty 
line (counting the non-poor as having zero shortfall) as a percentage of the poverty line” (The 
World Bank Group, 2012).  
The squared poverty gap also takes into account inequality among the poor, and assigns more 
weight to individuals that fall far below the poverty line than those close to it. This means that 
inequality is punished in terms of a higher squared poverty gap. The measure is calculated by 
squaring all distances from the poverty line before calculating the mean shortfall.  
These definitions of poverty are highly simplified, but nonetheless useful, as they make 
poverty and poverty reduction something that can be monitored and evaluated. These are the 
poverty measures reported in the World Development Indicators (with the exception of the 
squared poverty gap) and used in a lot of empirical work. It is however recognized that 
poverty is multidimensional. Most of the world’s poor are not just economically poor; they 
2 Definitions of key terms 
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are also poor in health, poor in political participation, poor in education, poor in social 
inclusion, poor in security and so many other aspects of life (OECD, 2001). For the further 
work and estimations I will be doing the simple definitions of absolute poverty are sufficient. 
 
2.3 Poverty reduction 
With application of the absolute poverty definitions, poverty reduction can be simply defined 
as reduction in a given poverty measure, e.g. the poverty headcount ratio or poverty gap 
indexes.  
In relation to the headcount ratio poverty reduction is quite easy to obtain by simply lifting the 
people closest to the poverty line from directly below it to directly above it. This will not have 
much impact in terms of giving people a better life, but will look good in poverty statistics. 
This reasoning tells us that the headcount measures could be quite easily manipulated, and 
poverty reduction should be evaluated against one of the other measures as well. 
Barder (2009) also highlights the need to distinguish between different types of poverty 
reduction and understand the possible trade-offs between current and future poverty 
reduction, broad and deep poverty reduction and temporary and sustainable poverty reduction. 
Many do not see these different facets of poverty reduction, but simply see it as something 
that can be achieved through economic growth and increases in GDP per capita, which 
according to Barder (2009) is overly simplified. The simplified approach is the one applied in 
the model I will be using, and these considerations of tradeoffs can be useful to have in mind 
when looking at the resulting allocation, and what kind of poverty reduction is being 
prioritized.  
 
2.4 Poverty-efficient aid allocation  
The poverty-efficient aid allocation is the allocation of aid that would lift the most people 
possible out of poverty, given that the total amount of aid is unchanged but can be 
redistributed among recipient countries. In line with economic theory this occurs when the 
marginal impact of an additional million dollars in aid is equalized across recipient countries 
(Collier & Dollar, 2002). In effect this means that it does not matter to which country the last 
dollar is allocated, because it would have the same impact on poverty reduction everywhere.  
2 Definitions of key terms 
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The poverty-efficient allocation of aid is used by Collier & Dollar (2001a, 2001b, 2002) as a 
benchmark allocation, against which the actual allocations are assessed. Their poverty-
efficient allocation is made on the basis of growth regressions supporting the assumptions that 
aid is most effective at reducing poverty when allocated to:  
i) Countries with high levels of poverty (different measures of poverty yield similar 
results) 
ii) Among these; countries with good economic policies 
These assumptions are laid out in the report Assessing Aid, published by the World Bank in 
1998, and have been hugely contested throughout the past decade, as I will return to in the 
chapter on empirical literature. My poverty-efficient allocation turns out to be independent of 
policy. 
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3 Norwegian aid at a glance 
Norway has a long and proud history as a donor of foreign aid, and is by many regarded a role 
model for other donors. The country is known to be generous, as one out of a few donors for 
which aid now consists more than one percent of its gross national income (GNI). Norway is 
also perceived to be selfless and concerned with recipient needs and aid effectiveness in the 
allocation of aid money (Patrick and Taylor 2009). Does this give a correct description of 
Norway as an aid donor? In this chapter I will give a brief overview of what have been the 
main priorities for Norway’s foreign aid throughout the last five decades. Norway has 
traditionally given a large share of its aid to low income countries, and more so than the 
average bilateral DAC donor (OECD, 2012). Significant changes have taken place in 
Norwegian aid policy, especially the last few years during Erik Solheim’s time as Minister of 
Development and the Environment. First and foremost the rainforest preservation initiative 
has been a new priority, accounting for a considerable share of the aid budget. This affects the 
allocation of aid in general and also the share pertaining to low income countries. This change 
of priority is therefore likely also to affect the poverty-efficiency of Norwegian aid based on 
the criteria in the model I will be using.  
 
3.1 Historical recap of Norway’s aid policy 
Since the outset of Norwegian foreign aid with the fishery project in Kerala, India, in the 
1950s, poverty reduction has been stated as one of its main priorities. This is evident in the 
choice of recipient countries and also in the strategy documents and White Papers published 
by the Norwegian government. In the 1960s and 1970s Norway had a few main partner 
countries that received large shares of the aid budget. These were all located in South Asia or 
in Sub-Saharan Africa and were among the poorest countries in the world at the time. In 1977 
Norway’s main partner countries were India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Kenya, 
Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique and Botswana (Ruud & Kjerland, 2003, p. 229). Being a 
main partner country entailed certain privileges. Norwegian representatives were present in 
the country with knowledge and competency, and there was also a long term commitment for 
aid disbursements. In the beginning Norwegian aid was highly committed to health, education 
and economic development projects, concerned with economic growth and poverty reduction.  
3 Norwegian aid at a glance 
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3.1.1 The concentration principle 
The so-called concentration principle was recurrent in White Papers and political debates 
throughout the 1970s and ‘80s. This was one of the most important principles for the aid 
policy of the Norwegian government. It entailed not spreading the aid money too much, but 
rather concentrate the disbursements to a few, preferably poor, main partner countries. In 
1974 the seven main partner countries received about two thirds of all Norwegian bilateral 
aid, and 55 other countries were also receiving support. In 1989 the share pertaining to the 
main partner countries, now also including Mozambique and Sri Lanka, was reduced to about 
fifty percent of the aid budget. Another 77 countries were on the list of recipients, now 
covering large parts of the developing world, although disbursements in many cases were 
quite small (Ruud & Kjerland, 2003, p. 230). Figure 3.1 shows that the number of recipient 
countries increased rapidly in the 1970s and again in the 1990s, but has remained quite stable 
or even declined a little since 2000. The main reason for the large number of recipient 
countries is the presence of Norwegian NGOs in developing countries. The number of 
countries receiving state to state funding is considerably smaller. 
 
Figure 3.1: Number of countries receiving Norwegian aid 1960-2010 
 
        Source: OECD.Stat 2012 
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3.1.2 Trade, not Aid 
In the 1970s the “Trade, not Aid” initiative was launched as part of the movement towards a 
New International Economic Order (NIEO)
3
 and also became embedded in the Norwegian 
development policy. Trade and market access were seen as possibly much more important 
than aid money for the developing countries themselves. Norway was an outspoken proponent 
of trade liberalization and granting of market access to developing countries. In practice the 
country had import restrictions on quite a few important export commodities from developing 
countries, creating an inconsistency between rhetoric and reality (Ruud & Kjerland, 2003). 
The new focus on trade was a contributing factor in challenging the Norwegian concentration 
principle. Norway’s main partner countries were of little or no commercial interest to the 
business and industry sector, and this resulted in a large expansion of countries in the 
development cooperation portfolio (Ruud & Kjerland, 2003, p. 45). This also meant that some 
of the new beneficiaries were lower middle income countries. 
 
3.1.3 Politics and development 
In 1983 Norway got its first Minister of Development, and with this came a stronger political 
direction of development issues. Whereas Norad previously had the main responsibility for 
projects and funds, it now became subordinated to the new ministry. A White Paper was 
published in the mid 1980s stating once again that the foundation of Norwegian aid was 
poverty reduction and covering the basic needs of the poor. The long term objective was to 
help the poor to help themselves by providing infrastructure, small scale industry and loans 
and through this create opportunities for increased productivity and trade in the long run 
(Ruud & Kjerland, 2003, pp. 154-155). The focus of the Norwegian policy in this period 
partly switched from poor countries to poor people, and this approach somewhat collided 
with the principles behind the NIEO, which worked on a macro level trying to improve the 
economic situation of Third World countries. The Norwegian government was also criticized 
for providing “short term social care” and to some extent ignoring the long term goal of 
increased economic growth as basis for development (Ruud & Kjerland, 2003, p. 156).  
 
                                                 
3
 The New International Economic Order (NIEO) was a movement that started in the 1970s, working for leveling 
the playing field for developing countries, granting them market access and fair prices for their commodities. 
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3.1.4 Debt crisis and Structural Adjustment Programs 
The 1980s was also the decade of debt crisis and economic stagnation in many developing 
countries. During the 1970s the countries had been borrowing heavily from commercial 
Western banks, the World Bank and the IMF, and were encouraged to do so in order to create 
a foundation for future economic growth. The main investments were made in the agricultural 
sector, where African and South American countries were thought to have a comparative 
advantage over developed countries.  
In 1982 Mexico was the first country to default repayment, soon followed by other Latin 
American countries. In the next stage also African countries, whose debt often amounted to 
three times their GDP, defaulted. Most of these countries were subjected to structural 
adjustment programs (SAPs) by the IMF and the World Bank, which proved costly for their 
economies. Several countries experienced negative economic growth for many consecutive 
years; some during the full decade and a long way into the 1990s, and at the end of the period 
were even poorer than at the outset. The programs largely entailed “getting prices right” 
which meant devaluation of local currencies to help exports, however making imports from 
abroad all the more costly. Trade liberalization and large cuts in the public sector were also 
required, and this led to reduced social welfare programs and salaries in the countries 
involved (Ruud & Kjerland, 2003, p. 163).  
In the beginning Norway was quite uncritical to the approach of the IMF and the World Bank, 
which in many cases acted as the government of countries, pretty much commanding how to 
manage national finances. The role of the multilateral institutions was not discussed much in 
the Norwegian national assembly; however some critics did voice their opinions. There were 
also confrontations within the Norwegian aid community and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
about how to handle the situation. It was seen as important to continue support to the 
multilateral organizations, but it was also realized that this in effect put the World Bank in 
charge of Norway’s foreign aid policy. At the same time Norway continued funding the 
sectors that were negatively affected by the SAPs in recipient countries. As can be seen from 
Figure 3.2 below, the multilateral share of Norwegian aid budget declined quite sharply in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, and fell from almost 45 percent in 1982 to about 27 percent in 
1994. It is not unlikely that this was partly due to skepticism towards the IMF and the World 
Bank.  
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Figure 3.2: The share of multilateral disbursements in the Norwegian aid budget 
 
Source: Norad 
3.1.5 The right to development 
In the 1990s, after the end of the cold war, the focus of development shifted towards 
governance, institution building, democracy and human rights. This was also the case for the 
Norwegian aid policy and has been an important focus ever since. The right to development is 
deeply founded in the notion of every human being’s inherent value and dignity. The 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948) states that everyone has the right to a 
reasonable standard of living, including food, clothing, housing, medical treatment and 
essential social services. In this sense, the fact that more than one billion people in the world 
today are living in extreme poverty is a severe violation of human rights. Mary Robinson, 
former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights once said:  
 
“I am often asked what is the most serious form of human rights violation in the world today, 
and my reply is consistent: extreme poverty.” 
 
Mary Robinson,  
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (1997-2002) 
 
As we reached year 2000 the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were enacted, and 
there was a renewed focus on basic development issues like eradication of extreme poverty 
and hunger, universal primary education, and child and maternal health. The 2003 White 
Paper “Fighting Poverty Together” bore witness of the Norwegian government’s continued 
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commitment to the World’s poor with a renewed focus on poverty reduction and aid 
effectiveness, as well as stating the moral obligation of rich countries to help those less 
fortunate. This White Paper also specifically addressed the need to make aid more efficient, 
and the responsibility and ownership of recipient countries for their own development 
(Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003-2004).  
 
3.2 Recent developments in Norwegian aid disbursements 
The past ten years Norwegian aid disbursements have been more than trebled in terms of US 
dollars, from about $1310 million in 2000 to $4757 million in 2010 (OECD, 2013). This 
places Norway tenth in size among the DAC donors, and renders it a medium size donor in 
absolute terms. Norway is however a generous donor. It was one of the first DAC countries to 
reach the UN goal of contributing 0.7 percent of its GNI to aid in 1976 and has stayed above 
this target for more than 30 consecutive years (Patrick & Taylor, 2009). As from 2009 it is 
also one of a small handful donors that have  reached the one percent target.
4
  
 
3.2.1 Major recipient countries  
The composition of the largest recipients of Norwegian aid has changed radically the past 
twenty years. In the 2000s the distinction between partner countries and other recipients has 
also gradually faded away. Table 3.1 below displays the top 15 recipients of Norwegian aid 
for the three periods 1990-91, 2000-2001 and 2010-11. From these lists it is evident that  
i) Low income countries do not seem to have the same priority in the allocation 
today as twenty years ago. 
ii) The top recipients are allocated a declining share of the total aid budget, which 
implies less concentration of disbursements. 
iii) New priorities of preventing climate change as well as conflict resolution seem to 
a large degree to influence which countries receive the most aid money. 
  
                                                 
4
 In 2011 it was only accompanied by Sweden, which contributed 1.1 percent of its GNI in aid. Luxembourg was 
above the 1 percent target in 2009 and 2010, but fell down to 0.99 percent in 2011. 
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Table 3.1: Top recipients of Norwegian aid (percent of total) 
1990-91 2000-01 2010-11 
Tanzania 7.90 Serbia 4.09 Brazil 5.22 
Mozambique 5.07 Mozambique 2.70 Afghanistan 2.72 
Zambia 4.47 Tanzania 2.68 Tanzania 2.50 
Bangladesh 3.60 West Bank & Gaza Strip 2.50 West Bank & Gaza Strip 2.33 
Nicaragua 2.59 Afghanistan 2.00 Sudan 1.72 
Ethiopia 2.15 Bosnia-Herzegovina 1.82 Mozambique 1.66 
Botswana 2.04 Zambia 1.74 Uganda 1.60 
India 1.96 Uganda 1.55 Zambia 1.40 
Zimbabwe 1.92 Ethiopia 1.52 Malawi 1.38 
Sri Lanka 1.50 Bangladesh 1.49 Pakistan 1.22 
Kenya 1.16 Angola 1.30 Somalia 1.22 
Pakistan 1.12 Somalia 1.24 Nepal 1.02 
Namibia 0.98 South Africa 1.21 Haiti 0.96 
Mali 0.84 Sri Lanka 1.14 Guyana 0.72 
Sudan 0.82 Nicaragua 1.06 Vietnam 0.67 
Total  38.12   28.04 
 
26.34 
 
Source: OECD.Stat 
Whereas the top recipients in 1990-91 were solely least developed countries (LDCs) and other 
low income countries (OLICs), the 2000-01 and 2010-11 allocations are characterized by 
large disbursements to lower or upper middle income countries (LMICs/UMICs).
5
 Serbia, 
West Bank & Gaza Strip, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil and Guyana are all on the list because 
of new priorities in aid allocation in the two latter periods.  
A second feature that stands out is that the share of the aid budget allocated to the top 
recipients is steadily declining. In 1990-91, 38 percent of the budget was devoted to the 
fifteen largest recipients, with the top six accounting for almost 26 percent. In 2010-11 the 
share of the top 15 recipients was 26 percent. It also seems like this process has been going on 
for a while when looking at the numbers for 2000-2001. These are more similar to today’s 
figures than to the ones from twenty years back. 
Noteworthy for the 2010-11 allocation is the presence of Brazil on top of the list, receiving 
5.22 percent of the Norwegian aid budget. The aid disbursements to this country and to 
Guyana, also among the top 15 recipients, are almost exclusively devoted to forest 
preservation. Many of the top recipients are also post-conflict countries. Peace building and 
                                                 
5
 A complete list of DAC recipients of official development assistance (ODA), grouped by income, can be found 
in Appendix A. 
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climate change are among the core areas of the Norwegian government’s aid policy and have 
been stated as areas that will gain priority as the aid budget is increasing (Norwegian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, 2008-2009). Quite a few of the top countries in today’s allocation are still 
low income countries, although the allocation seems to be less targeted to this group. 
 
3.2.2 Allocation across income groupings 
Figure 3.3 shows the allocation of Norwegian aid across income groupings. The allocation of 
Norwegian aid has the past twenty years become less targeted to low income countries, and an 
increasing share is now “unallocated by income”. This is mainly due to parts of bilateral funds 
being disbursed through multilateral organizations like different UN agencies or civil society 
organizations. An increasing share of the Norwegian aid budget is also devoted to so-called 
global allocations, which are disbursed to thematic areas rather than to specific countries. 
These disbursements are administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in this sense 
subject to stronger political direction. Within these allocations we find the funds for rainforest 
preservation, conflict resolution, global health initiatives and money spent on refugees in 
Norway. 
Figure 3.3: Norwegian aid allocation across income groupings in 2010 
 
Source: OECD.Stat 
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From Figure 3.4 below we can see that the share of the aid budget pertaining to least 
developed countries (LDCs) was close to 50 percent in the early 1990s, and has since then had 
a steady decline towards today’s level of 29,1 percent. This coincides with an increasing share 
that is unallocated by income. Disbursements to more advanced developing countries and 
territories (MADCT) are almost non-existent in the current Norwegian budget, and the share 
of other low income countries is also very small. The DAC average has traditionally been a 
lower share to low income countries, at between 20 and 30 percent of the budget, and more to 
the lower middle income countries. 
Figure 3.4: Development of disbursements across income groupings  
 
Source: OECD.Stat 
3.2.3 Allocation across sectors 
One of the most pronounced changes in the Norwegian aid budget the last decade is its 
composition across sectors. There has been a large increase in disbursements to environment 
and energy, and in 2010 this sector accounted for about 16 percent of the total budget, as 
opposed to 7 percent in 2000 (Norad, 2011). Since 2006 the disbursements made to 
environment and energy – mainly forest preservation – have been quadrupled in dollar terms 
and more than doubled as a share of total aid. In 2010 this sector received more than the 
traditionally very important sector economic development and trade, and more than the share 
devoted to good governance which was on an upsurge in the 1990s and is still of importance. 
Figure 3.5 gives a graphical representation of Norwegian aid allocation by sector in 2010. 
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Figure 3.5: Norwegian aid allocations by sector in 2010 
 
Source: Norad  
 
It also appears that economic development and trade has gained importance again the past 
decade, after having a declining share of the aid budget ever since 1980. Disbursements to 
both of these sectors are still increasing in absolute terms, but they have gained little 
importance relative to other sectors the latest years. It can be noted that all budget support 
from Norway to the governments of developing countries are found in the economic 
development and trade sector.  
Health and education are sectors where disbursements seem to have stagnated the past decade, 
and whose shares of the total aid budget have declined, as can be seen in Figure 3.6. This is 
quite remarkable, as they used to be the very core of Norwegian development assistance. 
These are also possibly very important sectors for future poverty reduction, in laying the 
ground for democracy, human rights and economic growth. The health related MDGs, and 
especially infant and maternal health, are still listed among the main priorities in the 
Norwegian government’s latest White Papers on development. Considerable funds are also 
earmarked for primary education in order to support the MDGs, especially in conflict areas. 
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One possible reason that these sectors seem to have lost importance could be the new strategy 
of focusing bilateral aid on areas where Norway has special competency, and channeling 
funds to traditional sectors like health and education through multilateral donors (Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008-2009). 
 
Figure 3.6: Development of sectorial disbursements as share of total aid 1980-2010 
  
          Source: Norad 
 
Average figures have the disadvantage of camouflaging individual differences across 
countries. Many of the poorest recipient countries still have the bulk part of their aid 
disbursed to the apparently declining sectors of economic development and trade, education 
and health. These include Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burundi, West Bank & Gaza, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Timor-Leste, Zimbabwe, Eritrea, India, Nigeria, 
Vietnam and Madagascar (Norad, 2010). This contributes to turn the picture around a bit, 
compared to the overall impression that these sectors get less funding. Even though their 
shares of the total budget decline, disbursements in absolute terms are increasing.  
Good governance is the main sector receiving aid in countries like Kenya, Angola, Bosnia 
Herzegovina, DR Congo, Kosovo, Nicaragua, Serbia, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Sudan, most of 
which are post-conflict societies. From 1999 onwards this sector is devoted to conflict 
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resolution and prevention as well as support to government and civil society (Norad, 2011; 
Norad, 2010). 
Countries receiving almost all of their aid as support to the environment and energy sector are 
Brazil, Guyana and Indonesia, where forest preservation is most pronounced.  This means that 
there are really just a few countries to which these kinds of funds are provided. Still it is an 
enormous amount of money, which accounts for about ten percent of the total aid budget. 
More than fifty percent of disbursements to China and Liberia were also devoted to this sector 
in 2010 (Norad, 2010). 
 
3.2.4 New priorities 
The Stoltenberg II government that came into power in 2005 has attempted to integrate 
environmental and developmental policy. This approach became even more pronounced when 
Erik Solheim in 2007 became Minister of the Environment in addition to his post as Minister 
of Development. In its latest White Paper on development from 2011 the government 
advocates for the importance of climate and sustainable development for poverty reduction. 
Its claims are based on the assumption that much of the growth in developing countries today 
is grounded in depletion of natural resources, and will therefore not be sustainable in the long 
run. “This is the greatest paradox of international environmental and development policy: if 
the fight against poverty is based on economic growth that exacerbates climate change, it will 
in itself create more poverty” (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011, p. 10). In this 
sense perhaps forest preservation could be one way of preventing future increases in poverty, 
and thereby be of importance. This is one of the tradeoffs mentioned in the definition of 
poverty reduction, as I will get back to in the final remarks. In the model I outline this will not 
be considered, and Brazil as a middle income country will most likely be found not to be 
eligible for aid receipts.  
 
The most recent White Papers also emphasize the role of conflict as an impediment to poverty 
reduction and the desire for Norway to be an important player in this field. This priority is 
reflected in the list of top recipients of Norwegian aid the past decade, where quite a few of 
the countries are post-conflict societies.  
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3.2.5 Challenges for the future 
In the latest DAC Peer Review of Norway from 2008, concern is posed about the increasing 
scattering of recipient countries and focus areas of Norwegian aid. It is argued that Norway’s 
aid is at risk of becoming fragmented and the effect of it diluted. The main reason for this 
claim is that Norway on top of its six core areas of development cooperation
6
 also tries to 
maintain support for 11 other traditionally important areas. DAC underlines the possible 
conflict of interest between an ever expanding aid portfolio and maintaining or improving aid 
effectiveness, where Norway is “rightly seen as a leading player” (Patrick & Taylor, 2009, p. 
52). The Peer Review committee recommends trying to limit the areas of attention to those 
where Norway has special competency and also concentrate efforts geographically. This 
would contribute to lowering administrative costs, and improving the overall efficiency of aid.  
 
 
  
                                                 
6
 These six core areas are i) climate change, the environment and sustainable development; ii) peace building, 
human rights and humanitarian assistance; iii) women and gender equality; iv) oil and clean energy; v) good 
governance and the fight against corruption; and vi) supporting the health related MDGs (Patrick & Taylor, 
2009, p. 52). 
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4 Modeling  
In this chapter I outline a model for poverty-efficient aid allocation, first developed by Collier 
& Dollar (2001a, 2002). This model explicitly states how much aid should be allocated to 
each recipient country to lift the most people possible out of poverty, under certain 
assumptions. The model assumes that poverty reduction occurs as a result of economic 
growth, and it is constructed in two stages. First the marginal effect of aid on economic 
growth is estimated using a panel regression model. The resulting expression is then inserted 
into an algorithm for poverty-efficient aid allocation. This algorithm is derived from the first 
order conditions of a maximization problem, where the purpose of giving aid is to maximize 
overall poverty reduction.  
The estimated poverty-efficient allocation in Collier & Dollar (2002) is radically different 
from the actual aid allocations that year, and according to the authors the same aid volume 
could have the potential to double poverty reduction just by reallocations among recipient 
countries. As we shall also see however, the model rests on a few crucial assumptions that 
have been subject to debate in the aid research community. I will get back to these in chapter 
5 on empirical literature. 
 
4.1 A model for poverty-efficient aid allocation 
Collier & Dollar (2002) formalize the idea of a poverty-efficient aid allocation by considering 
a world in which aid is given with the sole purpose of maximizing poverty reduction. 
Although there are many other reasons for giving aid, some of them purely in the interest of 
the donor country, this is a normative framework based on the moral rationale for aid. The 
World Bank, African and American Development Banks and many bilateral donors do state 
poverty reduction as the main goal of their development assistance (Barder, 2009, pp. 3-4). In 
the model poverty reduction is assumed to occur as a result of economic growth. This 
assumption will be discussed further in the literature chapter.  
Since the only way that aid can affect poverty reduction in this model is through economic 
growth, the objective of maximizing poverty reduction can be seen as an attempt to maximize 
a weighted average of growth rates across countries, the weights being population size times a 
poverty measure. The policies and income distributions of recipient countries are seen as 
exogenous to aid donors; in other words one cannot expect to be able to affect these by 
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allocation of aid.
7
 Poverty is reduced through growth in average income. The objective 
function of donors can then be written as: 
Max poverty reduction  
i
iiii NhG   (4.1) 
Subject to  
 
 
i
iii ANyA ,
 
0iA                             (4.2)
 
   
In these equations G symbolizes growth, which is assumed by the authors to be a function of a 
country’s policies and the amount of aid it receives,8   is the elasticity of poverty reduction 
with respect to income growth (for simplicity set to be the same for every country), h is a 
poverty measure (this could be a headcount index or a different measure), N is population, A 
denotes aid allocated to each country as a share of its GDP, y is per capita income (GDP) and 
A  is the total amount of aid. The superscript i is used to index each individual country. The 
budget constraint says that the sum of the dollar amount of aid to every country should be 
equal to the total aid budget. As written in (4.2) this implies that A
i
 represents aid receipts as a 
share of the recipient country’s GDP. However, this interpretation is not intuitive with the aid 
variable used by Collier & Dollar (2002).
9
 
When solving this maximizing problem the first order condition is given by
10
 
 iiii
a yhG    (4.3) 
 
Here i
aG  represents the marginal effect of aid on growth in per capita GNI and   is the so-
called shadow value of aid, which is determined endogenously in the model. The other 
parameters and variables are the same as in equation (4.1).  can also be interpreted as the 
marginal efficiency of aid, and using the headcount index as poverty measure this parameter 
would give us the number of people lifted from poverty by an additional (million) dollar(s) in 
                                                 
7
 In reality a lot of aid is given in an attempt to change a country’s policies or at least to reward good governance 
or democratic reform. Many aid programs can also be directly targeted to the poorest people of a society. 
Redistribution is one of the focus areas of Norwegian aid in the latest budget from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Nevertheless, changing the income distribution of a country is hard.  
8
 In my regressions this is not the case, as I do not get a significant interaction term between aid and policy. Thus 
the amount of aid a country receives and the degree to which the effect of it is diminishing are the only 
determinants of the growth effect of aid in my model.  
9
 The aid variable used by Collier & Dollar (2002) is net ODA divided by GDP per capita, in which case this 
budget constraint will not give the dollar amount of aid. 
10
 For a detailed exposition of the problem and the first order conditions, see Appendix B.  
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aid (Collier & Dollar, 2001a).  Dividing (4.3) by y
i
 gives the following expression for the 
shadow value: 
 
i
iii
a
y
hG 
  , 
 
 
It increases with the marginal effect of aid on growth, Ga
i
, the elasticity of poverty reduction 
with respect to income growth and the poverty rate and decreases with per capita income, 
which makes intuitive sense.  
Equation (4.3) is the basis for the algorithm that is constructed for poverty-efficient aid 
allocation, as we shall soon see.  
 
4.1.1 The marginal effect of aid on economic growth 
To be able to construct the poverty-efficient allocation of aid, I need to estimate a growth 
equation to get an expression for the marginal effect of aid on economic growth, i
aG  in (4.3). 
These kinds of growth regressions have been done by many, and have included various 
independent variables. I will try as far as possible to specify the equation in a similar way as 
Collier & Dollar (2002). They mainly want to test two hypotheses that are the main results 
from Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) analysis:  
i) The effect of aid on economic growth is contingent upon policy 
ii) The effect of aid on economic growth is subject to diminishing marginal returns 
 
These results have been subject to close scrutiny by critics. Many studies agree on hypothesis 
ii) and conclude that aid does show signs of diminishing returns with respect to its effect on 
economic growth (Dalgaard, et al., 2004; Hansen & Tarp, 2001; Hudson & Mosley, 2001; 
Lensink & White, 2001; Lu & Ram, 2001). This assumption is crucial to be able to construct 
the allocation rule for poverty-efficient aid, as we need the aid variable to appear in the 
derivative of the growth equation with respect to aid, i
aG . It is also intuitively reasonable that 
the growth effect of aid will decline when the aid volume increases, as we would expect 
countries to have a limited absorption capacity for aid. One study that does not find evidence 
of this diminishing effect is Rajan and Subramanian (2008).  
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As for the conclusion that the effect of aid on growth is contingent upon policy, that result has 
been highly contested. Very few other studies find this particular relationship in their data.
11
 I 
will get back to empirical literature and discuss this assumption in the next chapter, but first I 
present the growth equation and outline the rest of the model.  
Collier and Dollar include several explanatory variables in their regression, but the following 
specification is most interesting for testing their two hypotheses: 
 APAAPXcG 5
2
4321    (4.4 ) 
 
 
  
In this equation the main determinants of growth are aid (A) and policy (P), as well as some 
other exogenous factors (X). The coefficient of the quadratic term, 4 , will capture the 
possibility of diminishing returns to aid. That is, its growth-enhancing effect is decreasing 
with the volume of aid. I have just argued that this is also empirically found to be a common 
conclusion. The coefficient of the interaction term, 5 , takes into account the hypothesis that 
the effect of aid on growth is contingent upon policy, or is more efficient at promoting 
economic growth in a good policy environment. In this equation the marginal effect of aid on 
growth the partial derivative of (4.4) with respect to A equals 
 
 
PAGa 543 2    (4.5) 
 
4.1.2 The allocation rule 
When inserting for aG  in the first order condition from the maximization problem, (4.3), we 
get the following expression: 
   iii yhPA   543 2   
 
Solving for A  we can now derive a rule for the efficient amount of aid allocated to each 
individual country, as a share of the country’s GDP:  
                                                 
11
 The exceptions being Burnside & Dollar (2000); World Bank (1998); Collier & Dollar (2001a, 2002); Collier 
& Dehn (2001). 
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(4.6) 
 
The main property of this equation is the relationship between aid, policy and poverty. If one 
of these variables is held constant, the relationship between the other two can be illustrated in 
two dimensions, as Collier & Dollar (2002) do in their article. The poorer a country, the lower 
is the quality of policy required to justify a certain level of aid. When the regressions have 
been made we can easily insert values for the coefficients ,3 4 , 5  and the variables and 
get an explicit figure for aid allocated to each country in the sample.  
As will become clear in chapter 8, the results of my regressions do not give a significant 
interaction term between aid and policy, and the last part of equation (4.6) will therefore be 
eliminated. This means that my allocation rule is somewhat simpler, and the optimal level of 
aid is determined by the income level and poverty rate of a country.  
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5 Empirical literature  
There exists a vast literature on foreign aid, the effect of aid on the economies of the recipient 
countries, donor behaviour and aid allocation decisions. In this chapter I will focus on the 
literature that is the most relevant for my thesis, mainly looking at the assumptions made by 
Collier & Dollar (2002) and what others have found in similar kinds of studies and analysis.  
 
5.1 Underlying assumptions 
Two important assumptions made by Collier and Dollar in order to argue for the poverty-
efficiency of their aid allocation are subject to debate among researchers in the aid 
community:  
i) Aid has an effect on economic growth, and this effect is contingent on policy 
ii) Economic growth leads to, and is the driving force of, poverty reduction 
The first of these claims does not have a firm foundation in the empirical literature. It is 
perfectly possible to produce empirical findings to confirm and dismiss it, and this has been 
done repeatedly throughout the past decades. The second hypothesis is less disputed, but the 
extent to which growth is a sufficient condition for poverty reduction is still discussed.   
 
5.2 The effect of aid on economic growth  
The literature most central to my thesis are the journal articles by Burnside & Dollar (2000) 
and Collier & Dollar (2001a, 2002), which have been hugely influential and center of debate 
in the aid research community ever since they were published in the early 2000s. All three of 
them find a postive effect of aid on growth in the presence of good fiscal, monetary and trade 
policies. Aid is seen to have little or no effect on growth where economic policies are poor. 
The findings of Burnside & Dollar (2000) together with the World Bank Report “Assessing 
Aid” from 1998 had large policy implications, and also had consequences for the actual aid 
allocation practices of donors. Their results would justify selectivity of aid disbursements, 
granting money to good policy countries and withholding funds where the policy environment 
was not as conducive to growth.  
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Collier & Dollar (2001a, 2002) took the findings of Burnside & Dollar (2000) one step further 
and constructed their poverty-efficient allocation of aid, using the model outlined in the 
previous chapter, based on the assumption that aid works better in a conducive policy 
environment. If this is not the case, their allocation rule might be wrongly discriminating 
countries that should have been awarded more aid on the basis of their poverty rates and per 
capita income.  
Lensink & White (2000) make an analysis similar to the one by Collier & Dollar (2002). They 
find a positive and diminishing effect of aid on growth, but the interaction term between aid 
and policy is not statistically significant in their growth regressions. Their poverty-efficient 
allocation is therefore made without the policy term in the allocation rule. This results in an 
allocation of aid that is even more targeted to poor countries, as poverty rates and GDP per 
capita gain importance in the allocation rule. The diminishing effect is also found to be 
considerably lower than Collier & Dollar’s estimate, with the result that fewer countries are 
found eligible for aid receipts and each country receives a larger amount of aid. 
Others criticizing the conclusion that the effect of aid on growth is contingent upon policy are 
Easterly et al. (2004). They find weaknesses in Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) growth estimates 
and claim that they are not robust even to small changes in time periods or countries included 
in the regressions. They expand the dataset with more years and fill in missing observations in 
the original data either by econometric prediction or by actual data from different sources. 
Their main criticism is addressed to the relationship between aid and growth, and in particular 
the interaction term of aid with the policy variable. This is in fact found not to be significantly 
different from zero when expanding the dataset, and it turns out to be highly sensitive to the 
inclusion or exclusion of a few outliers also in the original regressions made by Burnside & 
Dollar (Easterly, et al., 2004).  
All of the studies mentioned until now conclude that aid does have a positive effect on 
growth, but this relationship is far from settled in the literature. Some actually find that aid 
has little or no impact on economic growth at all (Mosley, 1980; Boone, 1996; Rajan & 
Subramanian, 2008). The latter run a wide range of regressions with different specifications, 
time horizons and aid measures. They also account for the possible endogeneity of the aid 
variable by using different lagged variables as instruments in GMM estimation. None of their 
regressions produce significant evidence for an effect of aid on economic growth.  
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Others again find that aid has a positive impact on growth irrespective of the policy 
environment (Hansen & Tarp, 2001; Hudson & Mosley, 2001; Lensink & White, 2001; Lu & 
Ram, 2001). Similar studies also find the effect of aid on growth to be independent of policy, 
but claim that climatic conditions are important to explain the growth performance (Dalgaard, 
et al., 2004; Guillaumont & Chauvet, 2001). In these studies aid is seen to have less effect on 
growth in tropical areas. Others advocate for the importance of institutions (Burnside & 
Dollar, 2004), or political stability (Islam, 2005; Chauvet & Guillaumont, 2004) rather than 
policy as determinants of aid effectiveness. Most of these studies also conclude that the effect 
of aid on economic growth is subject to diminishing returns. 
McGillivray et al. (2006, p. 1045) wrap up the findings of many studies in the field. They 
argue that despite the controversies about the impact of aid on the economies of developing 
countries, one thing can be said to have been agreed upon: aid does appear to have a positive 
effect on economic growth. From this they also conclude that poverty would be more 
widespread in today’s world in the absence of aid. As mentioned, Rajan and Subramanian 
(2008) once again draw this conclusion into question.  
 
5.3 The link between growth and poverty reduction 
The assumption that economic growth leads to poverty reduction and is the most important 
driver behind it is also disputed in the research community. Most researchers will agree that 
economic growth is a necessary condition for poverty reduction. Most will however also 
agree that growth in itself is not sufficient for poverty reduction. When is growth pro-poor? 
What is pro-poor growth? Could economic growth have adverse effects on poverty rates and 
actually deteriorate the conditions of the poor or increase poverty? These questions are closely 
related to the relationship between growth, inequality and income distribution.  
 
5.3.1 The Kuznets curve 
One well-known example of how this process could unfold is the Kuznets curve, which plots 
the relationship between per capita income and inequality. The curve takes the shape of an 
inverted U, which suggests that in the process of growth inequality will first rise and then, 
after the economy reaches a certain level of per capita income, once again decline (Todaro & 
Smith, 2006, p. 212). This corresponds to the empirically observed low levels of inequality in 
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countries with low or high per capita income and higher levels of inequality in middle income 
countries. This could also suggest that the number of poor people would actually increase in 
the beginning of a growth process in a country with a low per capita income, before it could 
eventually start declining.  
One important reason to treat Kuznets’ hypothesis with caution is that it was constructed on 
the basis of a cross-section of countries – not time series for individual countries during the 
process of growth – which means that there could be other reasons for this pattern to appear. 
One valid point of criticism is that most of the middle income countries with high inequality 
are Latin American, and perhaps inhibit other traits that could be associated with high 
inequality. 
  
5.3.2 Pro-poor growth 
What does it take for growth to be pro-poor? One view holds that growth is pro-poor if the 
accompanying change in income distribution by itself reduces poverty (Kakwani, 2000). This 
is a quite restrictive definition. According to Kraay (2006) its application would imply that the 
rapid growth of China the past decades was not pro-poor because the poor gained relatively 
less than the non-poor in the process, i.e. there was a rise in inequality. Knowing that millions 
of Chinese people were lifted out of poverty in the same period, this does appear rather strict. 
A broader and more intuitive definition is that growth is pro-poor if the poverty measure of 
interest falls (Kraay, 2006, p. 199). This is the one most frequently applied in empirical 
research.  
 
Kraay (2006) further looks into three possible sources of pro-poor growth; i) a high growth 
rate of average incomes; ii) a high sensitivity of poverty to growth in average incomes and iii) 
a poverty-reducing pattern of growth in relative incomes. The results are quite interesting, as 
it turns out that in his data 70 percent of poverty reduction in the short run and 97 percent in 
the long run can be ascribed to growth in average incomes. This suggests that growth is 
actually a very strong determinant of poverty reduction.  
 
Several studies conclude that it does look like the lowest quintile of the income distribution 
receives its proportionate share of the benefits from economic growth; that is, growth in 
average GDP per capita translates into proportional growth in the income of the poor (Dollar 
& Kraay, 2001; Ravallion, 2001; Roemer & Gugerty, 1997). If the income distribution stays 
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the same during the process of growth, the absolute number of people living below the 
poverty line will decline even if inequality between the rich and poor will increase in absolute 
terms.  
 
5.3.3 The elasticity of poverty reduction with respect to income growth 
The effect of growth on poverty reduction will also depend on the elasticity of poverty 
reduction with respect to income growth, that is, the percentage reduction in poverty rates 
associated with a one percent change in mean per capita income. This in turn varies with – 
among other things – inequality. Empirical findings suggest that inequality in itself is negative 
for economic growth (Barro, 2000). It also appears that growth is less successful at reducing 
poverty in high inequality societies. This makes intuitive sense, as with high inequality a 
smaller portion of the benefits of growth accrue to the poor, and poverty is reduced in a 
smaller manner than would be the case with a more equal income distribution.  
 
Studies from the 1990s and early 2000s find poverty elasticities in the range between 1.5 and 
5, with an average of around 3. One recent journal article however suggests that the poverty 
elasticity of growth has declined the past decades, and that the poverty-reducing impact of 
growth was larger in the 1980s and 1990s than today. Particularly the elasticities of India and 
South Asia as a region are found to be very low and considerably lower than the average for 
LDCs as a group (Lenagala & Ram, 2010). The average estimated elasticity in the period 
1999-2005 is 1.42 for the $1.25 a day poverty line, whereas the estimate for India is a mere 
0.26. These findings could indicate that growth no longer has the same effect on poverty 
reduction as it did a few decades back. The lower elasticity is however associated with higher 
average growth rates, as the percentage decline in poverty is higher today than ten or twenty 
years ago.  
 
 
5.4 Other channels for aid to reduce poverty 
Collier and Dollar (2002) assume that aid has an impact on economic growth mainly through 
the policy environment, and in their model this growth is the only way in which aid enables 
poverty reduction.
 
Lensink & White (2000)
12
  are critical to this praise of economic growth as 
the solution to the world’s poverty problems. They do recognize that growth is important, but 
stress that other measures, e.g. redistributive policies, should be in place to secure the path 
                                                 
12
 Their comments are directed to the authors’ World Bank Working Paper ‘Aid Allocation and Poverty 
Reduction’ from 1999. This is however quite similar to the published version from 2002. 
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from growth to poverty reduction. They also emphasize that aid can help human development 
and poverty reduction through other channels than growth, for instance by supporting health 
and education programmes that improve the general living conditions of the poor. Growth 
without these additional measures will not be sustainable in the long run.  
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6 The Data 
In this chapter I present the data used in my analysis, explain the variables and how they are 
measured, their availability and their sources. A full description of variables, source and 
descriptive statistics is posted in Appendix D. 
 
6.1 My dataset 
I have compiled my dataset collecting variables from several online databases and datasets, 
the most important being The World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) and 
PovcalNet, OECD’s online database OECD.Stat, Penn World Table (PWT) 7.1 and the QoG 
Standard dataset from the Quality of Government Institute at the University of Gothenburg. 
My regressions include data on 80 countries for 36 years from 1974 through 2009, averaged 
over nine four-year periods. This is adding another 21 countries and three time periods to 
dataset of Collier & Dollar (2002) whose data ranges from 1974 through 1997. In most of the 
growth regressions, only seven time periods (years 1982-2009) are included because of the 
lack of complete observations for all variables in all time periods. The main reason for the 
shortening of the panel is the inclusion of the institutional variable, ICRG, which is not 
available until the early 1980s. Where one variable is missing it will result in excluding the 
observation from the regression (this is done automatically by Stata). Quite a few countries 
have incomplete data for important variables like GNI growth, policy or institutional quality 
and therefore fall out of the analysis for certain time periods. The mean number of 
observations for each country is 5.4, ranging from 1 to 7. This leaves me with an unbalanced 
panel, the implications of which I will get back to in section 7.5 on econometric pitfalls. The 
table in Appendix F displays all countries and the number of periods they are included in the 
regressions. 
The poverty-efficient allocation for 2010 includes 111 countries for which complete data on 
poverty and income are available. The income data are from 2010 and the poverty data from 
the latest available survey in PovcalNet. Most countries have poverty data from 2008 or from 
the mid 2000s. A few countries have quite old data, some from the mid 1990s.
13
 The poverty 
rates are likely to have changed significantly since then. All of the countries with old data are 
                                                 
13
 These are Trinidad and Tobago, Botswana, Algeria, Turkmenistan, Papua New Guinea and St. Lucia. 
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allocated 0 in the optimal allocation, so this will not have implication for the results. For this 
reason I have decided to keep all countries with available poverty data in the sample.  
 
6.2 Variables in the growth regression 
Several of the variables used by Collier & Dollar (2002) are not available to me, and I have 
needed to substitute for these in the regressions. This results in different variables for policy 
and institutions, and I also use a different aid variable in order to check the robustness of their 
results. 
 
6.2.1  The dependent variable 
Growth rate of per capita gross national income (GNI)  
GNI is defined as the “sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes 
(less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income 
(compensation of employees and property income) from abroad” (The World Bank Group, 
2012). The dependent variable in the regressions is the growth rate of per capita GNI, which 
is defined as annual percentage change in the gross national income divided by midyear 
population. This is the same dependent variable as Collier & Dollar (2002) use.
14
 The growth 
rates are averaged over periods of four years in order to follow Collier and Dollar’s analysis 
and the general approach in much of the aid-growth literature. The reason for using such 
averages is to be able to account for the world’s business cycle (Collier & Dollar, 2002). Data 
on this variable is collected from the WDI. 
 
6.2.2 Explanatory variables 
Initial per capita GNI 
This variable is GNI per capita for the first year of each time period, measured in constant US 
dollars. As an example this means that if period 3 consists of the years 1982-85, this measure 
will be GNI per capita for 1982. Data is collected from WDI. 
                                                 
14
 GNI was formerly called GNP, but these two measures are identical (The World Bank Group, 2012). 
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This variable is included in the growth regression to capture the hypothesis of conditional 
convergence between countries, which is the assumption that countries starting from a lower 
per capita income will grow faster than countries with a high per capita income, in line with 
the neoclassical growth model. The coefficient of this variable is expected to take a negative 
value in the regressions.  
 
Policy  
Collier and Dollar (2002) use the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 
(CPIA) as their policy variable. This measure includes 20 equally weighted indicators from 
four sub-categories: macroeconomic management, structural policies, policies for social 
inclusion and public sector management (Collier & Dollar, 2002, p. 1498). Data on CPIA is 
however not publicly available in the World Bank database prior to 2005.
15
 
 
In search of a suitable policy variable I have decided to follow the approach of Burnside & 
Dollar (2000) and construct the variable as a weighted average of a few macroeconomic 
indicators. I also considered entering the variables separately in the growth equation, which 
Hansen & Tarp (2001) and Rajan & Subramanian (2008) suggest might be a better solution. 
This will however not enable me to have a single interaction term between aid and policy, 
which is one of the main properties of Collier & Dollar’s growth equation.  
 
Burnside & Dollar (2000) use inflation, government budget surplus and openness to trade 
measured by the Sachs Warner Index
16
 in their policy variable. They construct the variable 
using as weights the coefficients from a growth regression that does not include the aid 
variable. This approach might be questionable since the constructed variable is later included 
in new regressions with more independent variables. This could have possibly changed the 
coefficients used as weights in the construction. An alternative way of constructing the policy 
                                                 
15
 I’ve been in contact with the Data Advisory Service and the Research Department at The World Bank 
inquiring about access to the original datasets or a longer time series of CPIA data. They were however not able 
to provide me with this. I have also corresponded with David Dollar via e-mail, but he no longer has access to 
the data as he has left the World Bank. Espen Villanger at CMI, who recently worked for the World Bank, also 
tried to get me the data without success.  
16
 The Sachs-Warner openness index is a dummy variable that takes the value 0 or 1. An economy is considered 
closed (the index is 0) if one of the following occurs: average tariffs on machinery and materials are above 40 
percent, the black-market premium is above 20 percent, or there is pervasive government control of key 
tradables  (Burnside & Dollar, 2000). 
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variable is by principal component analysis (PCA).
17
 Dunteman (1989, p.10) describes it like 
this: “Principal component analysis searches for a few uncorrelated linear combinations of the 
original variables that capture most of the information in the original variables”. For details on 
the construction of this variable, see Appendix C. 
The real challenge here is to find indicators that can truly be said to be policy indicators and 
not outcome variables. In many cases there will be an overlap between the two. Collier and 
Dollar (2002) include three independent macroeconomic indicators as control variables in 
their regressions, and these are the three I will use in my principal component analysis: 
openness to trade, inflation and government consumption. As mentioned Burnside & Dollar 
(2000) include budget surplus as a fraction of GDP in their policy variable instead of 
government consumption. This indicator might have been preferable to include in the PCA, 
but doing so reduced the number of observations in my regressions by almost two thirds, and I 
therefore decided not to include it.  
Openness to trade is a matter that to a certain degree can be decided by the government of a 
country. Empirical evidence suggests that openness is positively related to economic growth 
(Dollar & Kraay, 2004). The Sachs Warner Index has not been updated since the early 2000s 
when Wacziarg & Welch made some adjustments to the openness measure (Wacziarg & 
Welch, 2008). For most countries the status is likely to be the same today as ten years ago, as 
from 1995 to 2003 only ten to twenty countries changed status from closed to open or the 
reverse. I still prefer to use a different measure of openness as these data are a bit old. The 
most widely used in the literature besides Sachs-Warner is the rate of exports plus imports to 
GDP. I here apply a dummy variable which takes the value 0 if the share of trade to GDP is 
lower than 40 percent and 1 otherwise. One possible drawback with using this measure is that 
large countries will tend to have a lower “natural” level of openness, whereas small countries 
would be deemed more open simply as a result of their dependence on trade. This is not 
necessarily related to the countries’ policies toward openness. For many developing countries 
the trade policies of others will be just as important for their trade volumes as their own 
policies. This measure is however the most easily available, and also widely used in the 
literature. 
                                                 
17
 I was fortunate to talk to Craig Burnside during his visit to the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) in 
Bergen in October 2012, and I asked his advice regarding the choice of a policy variable. He suggested doing 
something similar to their approach, but using principal component analysis to derive the weights of the 
variables included. 
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The second indicator included in the principal component is inflation. In most European 
economies and in the US the monetary (and fiscal) policy is closely related to an inflation 
target. Inflation can in this way be interpreted as a policy variable that the government can, or 
at least tries to, control. Many developing countries do not have this kind of target for their 
monetary policy, but it is becoming more widespread. Whatever the monetary regime, it is 
evident that sound macroeconomic management is needed to keep inflation low and stable. 
Giving a lot of aid to a country with a very high inflation rate is not likely to be fruitful in 
spurring economic growth. For these reasons inflation is included in my policy variable. 
Bruno & Easterly (1998) argue that inflation is not a serious problem for economic growth 
until it reaches a critical threshold of 40 percent. This presumed non-linearity of inflation 
could be a rationale to include it as a dummy variable in the principle component, which is 
what I have done. The variable takes the value 1 when inflation is below 40 percent and 0 
when it is higher.  
The last indicator included is government consumption as percentage of GDP. This measure 
can indicate how involved the government of a country is in economic management and will 
give an approximation of the size of the public sector. A large public sector is often associated 
with inefficiency and waste of resources that could have otherwise been used for growth-
enhancing investments. When included directly as an explanatory variable in the growth 
regression, government consumption enters with a significant, negative coefficient. This could 
indicate the presumed association with growth, and is an argument for its inclusion in the 
policy variable. This indicator is also included as a dummy, taking the value of 1 if the rate of 
government consumption is between 10 and 40 percent of GDP and 0 if it is lower than 10 or 
higher than 40 percent. This approximation is made on the assumption that some public 
spending is needed in order to foster economic growth, but if the level becomes too high, 
inefficiency will arise. The size of this measure for developed economies mainly ranges from 
about 15 to 35 percent, so this is the reasoning behind the interval set (World Bank, 2012).  
The policy variable can take eight different values based on the combination of the three 
indicators included. The value of the variable is higher whenever the dummy variables take 
the value of 1, which by the way they are constructed is presumed to be “good” for growth. 
The combination 0-0-0 gives the lowest value of the policy variable, and 1-1-1 the highest. 
Data on the variables included are collected from the WDI. 
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Policy is included in the regressions as a separate term and interacted with the aid variable. 
This is done in order to take into account one of the main results of Collier & Dollar (2002), 
namely the possibility that the quality of policy has implication for the effect of aid on 
growth. I expect policy to enter the growth regression with a positive coefficient. 
 
ODA- Official Development Assistance 
I estimate the growth regression using two different aid variables. The first is net ODA 
disbursements divided by real PPP GDP per capita.
18
 This is the aid variable used by Collier 
& Dollar (2002). For simplicity I henceforth refer to this variable as CDaid. ODA 
disbursements are measured in constant 2010-dollars whereas real PPP GDP per capita from 
PWT 7.1 is in constant 2005 international dollars. I therefore convert the ODA figures into 
2005-dollars by using the inflation conversion factors from Sahr (2012) before dividing it by 
the GDP measure.  
 
The second aid variable is ODA as percentage of recipient country GDP. This variable is 
constructed using net ODA disbursements in current dollars from OECD.Stat and GDP in 
current dollars from the WDI. For the estimations this variable will be called ODA/GDP 
percent. 
 
In the regressions the aid variable is included separately as a linear term and a squared term. I 
expect the coefficient of the quadratic term to be negative because of the assumption of 
diminishing returns to aid. The aid variable is also included in interaction terms with policy 
and with institutional quality.  
 
Institutional quality 
Collier and Dollar (2002) use International Country Risk Guide’s ICRGE as a variable for 
institutional quality. This data is restricted to subscription, and I do not have access to the 
dataset. I therefore use the ICRG ‘Quality of Government’ indicator from the QoG Standard 
dataset as a measure of institutional quality. The score ranges from 0 to 1 and is given as the 
mean value of three other ICRG indicators; corruption, law and order and bureaucracy 
                                                 
18
 “PPP GDP is gross domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. 
An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. 
GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus 
any subsidies not included in the value of the products” (The World Bank Group, 2012).  
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quality. This variable is also included in an interaction term with aid as a sensitivity check to 
the aid/policy interaction term. Data on this variable is available for the years 1984-2008, 
which shortens my panel by two periods. Institutional quality is assumed to be important for 
economic growth, and I expect this variable to enter with a positive coefficient.  
 
Other variables 
Collier and Dollar (2002) include openness to trade measured as the ratio of import + export 
to GDP, inflation rate and government consumption relative to GDP as control variables in 
their regression. These can be taken as indicators of the government’s ability for sound 
economic management, and in this respect can also be proxies for the quality of policies. As I 
use these three to construct my policy variable, they are not included separately in the 
regressions. 
 
Regional dummy variables are included in the regressions to capture possible region-specific 
time-invariant factors that affect growth. The variable is from the QoG Standard dataset, and 
is “a tenfold politico-geographic classification of world regions, based on a mixture of two 
considerations: geographical proximity and demarcation by area specialists having 
contributed to a regional understanding of democratization” (Teorell, et al., 2012, p. 143). 
Appendix D displays the countries in my dataset included in each regional group. 
 
Time dummies are included for each four-year time period to account for the world business 
cycle (Collier & Dollar, 2002). These variables capture occurrences that are common across 
countries but specific to one time period. The list of these dummy variables can be found in 
Appendix D.  
 
 
6.3 Variables in the algorithm for poverty-efficient allocation  
For the poverty-efficient allocation rule I also need data on per capita GDP and poverty rates.  
 
The income measure used in the poverty-efficient allocation is GDP per capita measured in 
current US dollars. 
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“GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the 
sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product 
taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated 
without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and 
degradation of natural resources” (The World Bank Group, 2012). 
 
The poverty measures I apply are the poverty headcount indexes at the 1.25$ a day and 2$ a 
day poverty lines and the corresponding poverty gaps and squared poverty gaps. These 
variables were defined in chapter 2.1.2. All data on poverty are collected from PovcalNet, an 
online poverty analysis tool developed by the World Bank's research department, the 
Development Research Group. This database is the source of the poverty data in the World 
Development Indicators. 
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7 Estimation method 
In this chapter I go into the choice of data structure and estimation method. I give a brief 
introduction to the properties of panel data and describe the different models I have 
considered for estimations, their strengths and weaknesses. These are the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) model, the fixed effects (FE) model and the random effects (RE) model. In 
section 7.5 I highlight possible econometric problems one can run into when doing 
estimations. Some of them also turn out to be relevant for my data. 
 
7.1 The choice of data and estimation models 
When performing econometric analysis the first thing to consider is what type of data to use 
and what model to estimate. For this kind of analysis the choice is initially between cross-
section and panel regression. In the earlier growth literature both have been applied, each with 
their benefits and limitations. Collier & Dollar (2002) use panel data and so do many other 
prominent studies in the field (Tarp, et al., 1999; Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Dollar & Kraay, 
2004; Rajan & Subramanian, 2008). This will be my approach as well, and in section 7.2 I get 
back to the advantages of panel data estimation.  
Several different econometric models could be estimated, and it is important to make the right 
decision to get unbiased and efficient results. OLS is the Best Linear Unbiased Estimator 
(BLUE) under the Gauss-Markov assumptions.
19
 This means that among all linear unbiased 
estimators OLS is the one with the smallest variance (Wooldridge, 2009, p. 835). OLS panel 
regression has been applied by many, including Collier & Dollar (2002). There are however 
several reasons to be cautious about OLS-estimation with panel data, for instance the 
possibility of unobserved individual heterogeneity or the risk of endogeneity of the 
explanatory variables. Several models are specifically adapted to estimation with panel data. 
Two of them are the random effects (RE) and fixed effects (FE) estimators. These are the ones 
I will be using for my estimations, in addition to running OLS regressions for the sake of 
comparison. The choice of estimation model will be treated in greater detail in sections 7.3 
and 7.4. 
                                                 
19
 I list these assumptions in Appendix E, as they appear in Wooldridge (2009, pp. 158-159). 
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7.2 The properties of panel data 
A data set constructed from repeated cross sections over time is a panel or longitudinal data 
set (Wooldridge, 2009, p. 843). The units of observation can be individuals, households, firms 
or as in this case, countries. Panel data is favorable in terms of giving a fuller description of 
the aid-growth relationship than a simple cross-section. General concerns in the application of 
empirical data are endogeneity, outliers, model uncertainty and measurement error, in 
addition to drawbacks like unobservable heterogeneity in the dataset or omitted variables 
(Rajan & Subramanian, 2008). Some of these problems can be addressed using panel data. 
Baltagi (2008, pp. 6-10) lists a number of benefits from using panel data, some of which are 
the following:  
i) Panel data can give “more informative data, more variability, less collinearity among 
the variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency.” (Baltagi, 2008, p. 7). 
The cross-sectional dimension of the data adds a lot of variability, and this can partly 
solve the problem of multicollinearity, which is the occurrence of high correlation 
between the independent variables in a multiple regression model, and very common 
in time series studies (Wooldridge, 2009, p. 842). The fact that there are two 
dimensions in the data also lets us produce more efficient parameter estimates. 
 
ii) Panel data are better suited for studying the dynamics of adjustment, for example the 
process of moving out of poverty for a household or a country. Panel data opens the 
opportunity of following an individual or a country throughout a time period. These 
kinds of estimations are however more common at the micro level, for instance related 
to the labor market.  
 
iii) The possibility of controlling for individual heterogeneity is perhaps the most useful 
feature of panel data. Countries are heterogeneous. Time series or cross-sectional 
studies that do not control for this heterogeneity are at risk of obtaining biased results 
(Baltagi, 2008, p. 6). All the variables in our growth regression vary with time and 
across countries, and this is not the cause of the problem, rather a strength of the data. 
It is however also possible that some characteristics vary across countries but stay the 
same within a country for the time period selected. If these characteristics are also 
affecting the growth of a country and are not included in the regression, the result is 
that we get an omitted variable bias in our coefficient estimates. It is possible to create 
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dummy variables for countries we know inhabit such traits, but this will result in 
excluding them from the sample if estimated as a time series or cross-section. With 
panel data it is possible to keep countries in the sample and at the same time control 
for any country-specific characteristics, observable or not. This is the virtue of the 
fixed effects model, which will be presented in section 7.4.1. 
Several methodological concerns are still present for panel data, and I will get back to these in 
section 7.5 on econometric pitfalls.  
 
7.3 OLS estimation 
The most common method of econometric estimation is the ordinary least square (OLS) 
model. This model fits the linear relationship between variables by minimizing the sum of 
squared residuals (Wooldridge, 2009, p. 843). For my growth equation OLS will estimate the 
following: 
itititititititit uPAAAPXG  5
2
43210  ,   
Here 0 is the overall intercept, and u is an error term that captures all factors not included in 
the regression that still have an impact on the dependent variable. Each variable is indexed by 
country (i) and time period (t). The error term is assumed to be uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables. This is the most important of the Gauss-Markov assumptions under 
which the OLS estimator is the Best Linear Unbiased Estimator (BLUE). An unbiased 
estimator is an estimator whose expected value is equal to the true population value of the 
parameter (Wooldridge, 2009, p. 847)  
The assumption of zero correlation between the explanatory variables and the error term is 
unfortunately likely often to be violated when dealing with panel data. This would be a 
violation of assumption OLS.4, and will cause OLS estimates to be biased. For this reason it 
is not advisable to use regular OLS regression to analyze panel data. Because the data are 
clustered, we would also expect unobserved heterogeneity between countries to lead to 
within-country correlations in the error terms (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008, p. 185). 
Clustering of data means that the observations in the panel naturally belong to different 
groups, in my case countries. This serial correlation arises if there are omitted variables at the 
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subject level, which would then be present in the error term for the country in consecutive 
periods.  
Another important assumption for OLS estimation is homoskedasticity, which means that the 
variance of the error terms is constant conditional on the explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 
2009, p. 839). If this assumption is violated, OLS will no longer be the efficient estimator. It 
is possible to test for the application of OLS by performing a Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian 
multiplier test for random effects. If this comes back with a significant test statistic, the null 
hypothesis of zero variance in the error terms is rejected, and OLS should not be applied. I ran 
this test on my data, and the test statistic was highly significant. This implies that OLS is not 
suitable for estimating this model. The result of the test can be found in Appendix G.  
 
7.4 Panel estimation models 
Most panel data models are estimated under the assumptions for fixed and random effects. 
These are posted in Appendix E, and are directly cited from Wooldridge (2009, pp. 503-505). 
I will get back to the most important assumptions when presenting the panel estimation 
models in the next sections. In the following I will be directly using some of the equations 
from Verbeek (2012, pp. 376-386).  
 
7.4.1 The fixed effects model 
The fixed effects model is a linear regression model in which the intercept terms vary over the 
individual units, i: 
 
ititiit uxy   ' , 
 
 
 2,0~ uit IIDu                        
Here yit is the dependent variable, i  (i = 1,…, N) are treated as fixed unknown constants that 
are estimated along with  , itx' is a vector of explanatory variables and itu  is the error term, 
which is assumed to be uncorrelated to the explanatory variables. The overall intercept term 
0  is omitted, as it is subsumed by all the individual intercepts, i . When applying this to my 
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growth regression the fixed effects model can be expressed as the following version of 
equation (4.4): 
 
 
itititititititiit uPAAAPXG  5
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For the further elaboration of the model it is more expedient to continue with the general form 
of the equation in order to find the expression for the estimated coefficients. The 'x  then 
represents all independent variables in the regression.  
This model could be fitted by including dummy variables for each unit i in the model, which 
would result in a regression with a very large number of independent variables. In my case 
this would mean having 80 dummy variables for the individual countries. A simpler approach 
that will give the same results is to calculate the estimator for   by performing the regression 
on deviations from individual means. This implies eliminating the individual effects i  by 
transforming the data. We have the following equation:  
 
iiii uxy   ' ,  
 
 
where  t iti yT
y
1
 and ix  and iu  have corresponding definitions. These measures 
represent the means for each country’s variables over time. We can now write:  
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The   obtained from this transformed model is called the within estimator or fixed effects 
estimator, and is defined by Verbeek (2012, p. 377) as: 
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Under the assumption that all itx  are independent of all itu , it can be shown that FEˆ  is an 
unbiased estimator for  . The virtue of the fixed effects estimator is that it allows for 
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spurious correlation between the independent variables and the country-specific intercepts, i  
which capture all observable and unobservable individual differences. This estimator has the 
great advantage of not being susceptible to bias due to omitted subject-level variables.  
One important drawback with this model is that the effect of variables that are constant over 
time cannot be calculated. These are omitted from the regression in Stata, which in my case 
entails losing the regional dummies. Another feature is that we in reality lose the cross-
sectional dimension of the data, since the coefficients will refer to the effects of the 
independent variables on the explained variable within each unit of observation. The result of 
this is that the estimates will be less precise than those of an estimator utilizing both 
dimensions of the data. This is a drawback that needs to be weighed against the possible 
biasedness of other estimators. 
 
7.4.2 The random effects model 
In regression analysis it is commonly assumed that all variables that are not included in the 
regression but still have an impact on the explained variable will be summarized in a random 
error term. For the random effects model this implies that the individual intercepts are treated 
as random factors independently and identically distributed (IID) over individuals (Verbeek, 
2012, p. 381). The random effects model can therefore be written as:  
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2
uit IIDu   ),0(~
2
 IIDi   
Or in the notation of my growth regression:  
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In this model the individual intercepts are part of the error term iti u . The individual effect 
i does not vary over time, and the second component is assumed to be uncorrelated over 
time. This means that all correlation in the error terms over time is ascribed to the individual 
effects. Because of this autocorrelation regular OLS will yield incorrect standard errors. This 
can be corrected by estimation by generalized least squares (GLS) which gives a more 
efficient estimator. The GLS estimator for random effects is given by:  
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where T is the number of time periods and 
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The parameters 2
u and 
2
  are the variances of the different components of the error term. It 
is easy to see that the GLS estimator collapses into the fixed effects estimator when T 
increases towards infinity, because this will imply 0 and the second part of the expression 
will be eliminated. In samples with a long time horizon the two estimation techniques will 
thus give the same result. The second part of the equation,  
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is called the between estimator and can be calculated by a regression of individual means that 
does not take into account the time series dimension of the data. The random effects (GLS) 
estimator is the optimal combination of the within and between estimators, and therefore more 
efficient than any of the other two under given circumstances. The most important of these 
conditions is that there is no correlation between the independent variables and the error 
terms. This is also the assumption that is most likely to be violated, in which case the random 
effects estimator, like the OLS estimator, will be biased. 
 
7.4.3 Fixed effects versus random effects 
The choice between fixed and random effects estimation is not an obvious one. This issue has 
generated hot debates in the biometrics and statistics literature, which has spilled over into 
panel data econometrics literature, and both approaches have strong proponents (Baltagi, 
2008, p. 21). Particularly when T is small there can be quite substantial differences in the 
coefficient estimates. This is also evident in my regressions. 
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The fixed effects approach is contingent on the values of the individual intercepts, i . This 
estimator considers the distribution of the dependent variable ity given i , where the i s can 
be estimated (Verbeek, 2012). Intuitively this approach makes sense if the individuals in the 
sample are ‘one of a kind’ and cannot be thought to be a random draw from some population. 
This would be an appropriate interpretation for our panel, where the units are countries.  
The random effects estimator can be expressed mathematically as:  
    ititit xxyE '0  , 
 
compared to the fixed effects estimator given by: 
   iitiitit xxyE   ',   
 
This gives some rationale to prefer the fixed effects model if one is interested in some 
individual effect, since these are ignored in the random effects model ( i  is part of the error 
term, whose expected value is zero). Even in cases where one is interested in larger overall 
effects and the random effects approach may be considered superior, fixed effects might still 
be preferable. This is because of the possible correlation between the explanatory variables, 
itx , and the individual part of the error terms, i . As mentioned, in the presence of such a 
correlation estimation by random effects will give biased estimators. This problem can be 
solved by incorporation of fixed effects (Verbeek, 2012, p. 385).  
Generally FE will be the more robust estimator, producing unbiased estimates, but will have 
greater variance in the estimates because it can only exploit one dimension of the data. The 
RE estimator will be biased if the correlation between the error term and explanatory 
variables is not zero, which will often be the case. This estimator is however more efficient 
than the FE estimator, producing coefficients with smaller standard errors. Sometimes a 
biased estimator with small variance could be preferable to an unbiased estimator with large 
variance and thus large standard errors. The true value of the estimator could then in theory lie 
closer to the biased RE estimator than to the unbiased FE estimator (Clark & Linzer, 2012).   
It is possible to test for the suitability of random effects estimation by performing a Hausman 
test on the data. This entails running both fixed effects and random effects models and testing 
for difference of the estimates. What is really tested is whether there is a correlation present 
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between the independent variables and the error terms. Under the null hypothesis both 
estimators can be applied, and the random effects estimator is the more efficient one. A 
rejection of H0 implies that RE gives biased estimates. Performing this test on my data, I do 
reject H0. Due to this I will be using the coefficients from the fixed effects model for my 
further analysis. The result of the test is posted in Appendix G. 
 
7.5 Econometric Pitfalls  
In dealing with econometric analysis there are many pitfalls that should be avoided in order to 
get correct estimates for the coefficients. These include problems of missing observations, the 
possibility of endogenous explanatory variables, autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and 
omitted variables. 
 
7.5.1 Missing observations 
Missing observations are always a challenge with large datasets. OECD-DAC has a vast 
database on aid disbursements and access to aid data is quite good. Missing data on policy or 
institutions is more prevalent, and this is the case for many observations in my data.  Stata 
excludes every observation for which all variables are not available from the regressions. The 
mean number of periods for each country in the regressions is 5.4. About half of the countries 
have observations for all 7 periods, a few countries for just one or two and the rest somewhere 
in between. This is unfortunate because it leaves me with an unbalanced panel, which might 
have consequences for the further analysis. It is perfectly possible to perform the analysis 
even with an unbalanced panel, and in most cases statistical packages like Stata will make 
adjustments to account for this.  
A more serious concern with using an unbalanced panel is the danger of selection bias. If 
observations are missing at random this will not be a problem, but if there is some 
endogenous reason that makes observations drop out of the sample, the use of an unbalanced 
panel may lead to biased estimators and misleading tests (Verbeek, 2012, p. 425). Even 
though rendering the panel unbalanced, it could be argued that the inclusion of single 
observations for some countries will give strength to the data by making them more 
informative and adding variation. The complete list of countries and time periods included in 
my regressions is posted in Appendix F.  
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7.5.2 Possible endogeneity of the aid variable 
Several authors highlight the possibility of an endogenous aid variable in the growth equation 
due to simultaneity
20
 (Dalgaard, et al., 2004; Hansen & Tarp, 2001; Rajan & Subramanian, 
2008). It is not implausible that aid could be given partly as a response to either good or bad 
growth performances, which would complicate the settling of causality in the regressions. 
Estimation with OLS in the presence of endogenous explanatory variables will give rise to 
biased estimates because the variable will be correlated to the error term (Wooldridge, 2009, 
p. 846). Whenever there is uncertainty about the possible endogeneity of explanatory 
variables, alternative approaches need to be considered.  
Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) or the more advanced Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimation have been used by several authors the last decade to take into account the 
possible endogeneity of the aid variable (Hansen & Tarp, 2001; Rajan & Subramanian, 2008). 
Burnside & Dollar (2000) estimate their growth equations with OLS and 2SLS instrumenting 
for aid, and find little difference between the estimates. Collier & Dollar (2002) take this as 
evidence that there is not an endogeneity problem and settle for the general OLS panel 
estimation. Instrumentation strategies also have their challenges, especially when it comes to 
choosing good instruments.
21
 Applying weak instruments is just as bad as estimation with a 
biased estimator, and will lead to misguiding estimates and tests. Deaton (2009) argues that 
many of the instruments used in recent studies are in fact not exogenous and thus would not 
yield the correct results in 2SLS or GMM analysis. In my dataset there are no variables that I 
find suitable for instrumentation. Some frequently used instruments of aid are the relative 
sizes of donor and recipient, the geographical distance between them, or previous colonial 
links. All of these measures would require data on each pair of donor and recipient. This rules 
out using this instrumentation strategy as my data are on aggregate aid. Due to this I have 
decided not to run any regressions with instrument variables. The usefulness of making such 
estimations is also reduced as the results are likely not to be reliable. 
 
                                                 
20
 Simultaneity means that at least one of the explanatory variables in a multiple linear regression is determined 
jointly with the dependent variable (Wooldridge, 2009, p. 846). 
21
 An instrument is a variable that does not appear in the regression, is uncorrelated with the error in the 
equation, and is (partially) correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable (Wooldridge, 2009, p. 840). 
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7.5.3 Autocorrelation 
If the error terms in the model are correlated in different time periods, the errors suffer from 
autocorrelation. This is always a concern with time series data, and can also generate 
problems in panel datasets. The fixed effects and the random effects models both assume that 
the idiosyncratic errors, itu , are uncorrelated over individuals and time because the i  is 
believed to capture all correlation between the unobservable factors not included in the 
regression. Provided that the assumption of strict exogeneity
22
 of the itx  holds, the presence 
of autocorrelation in itu  
does not lead to biased estimators (Verbeek, 2012, p. 389).  
In testing my data for autocorrelation the test statistic is marginally significant at the 5 percent 
level, so the null hypothesis of zero autocorrelation is rejected. The result of this test is posted 
in Appendix G. In the previous literature on aid and growth, perhaps somewhat surprising, 
autocorrelation is very rarely mentioned as a potential problem. Autocorrelation can however 
cause the standard errors and test statistics to be invalid, and complicate the ability to draw 
conclusions from the regressions because the estimators will no longer be efficient. 
 
7.5.4 Heteroskedasticity 
Heteroskedasticity is the phenomenon that the variance of the error term, given the 
explanatory variables, is not constant (Wooldridge, 2009, p. 839). It is rarely the case that 
errors are homoskedastic in the first place, but this is not a major concern. Heteroskedasticity 
can be easily corrected for by incorporating robust standard errors in the regressions. If the 
standard errors are similar in the two different estimations, nothing is lost using the robust 
ones. If there is a significant difference between them, the robust errors should be used. This 
is the reason why all my coefficients are calculated using robust standard errors. 
 
7.5.5  Omitted variables 
The risk of omitting relevant variables is definitely present in these kinds of growth 
regressions. Empirical studies find that about twenty different variables can be said to have an 
effect on economic growth (Sala-i-Martin, 1997). Omitted variables will lead to biased 
estimators. This is a smaller concern using the fixed effects model because this model allows 
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 The assumption that the explanatory variables xit are uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic errors in every time 
period (Wooldridge, 2009, p. 846). Formally this is written: E(xit, uit) = 0. 
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for variables omitted at the subject-level to be correlated to independent variables in the 
growth equation. 
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8 Results 
This chapter presents the results of my growth regressions. I estimate the growth equation 
using two different aid variables. I also run the regression with and without different 
independent variables and with and without outliers and a set of countries not included in 
Collier & Dollar’s poverty-efficient aid allocation. The different specifications have large 
consequences for the results, which turn out to be sensitive to small changes, especially in 
relation to outliers.  
 
8.1 Estimating the growth regression 
I have decided to follow Collier & Dollar (2002) as closely as possible in specifying the 
growth regression. This leads me to estimating the following equation, where the main 
explanatory variables for economic growth are aid and policy, and the two interacted:  
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In this equation the X represents all other explanatory variables in the regression. In my case 
these include initial per capita GNI, the institutional variable and an interaction term of this 
with aid, as well as regional dummies and time dummies. The data included in most of the 
regression are from period three through period nine. This means that time dummies for 
period four through nine should be applied in the equation.
23
  
 
8.1.1 Value of comparison with baseline 
To be able to fruitfully compare my results to Collier & Dollar (2002) it would be ideal to 
start out with a dataset similar to theirs and subsequently expand the number of countries and 
time periods included. I have organized my data into four-year averages like they do, but the 
first two time periods, 1974-77 and 1978-81, fall out of the regressions once the institutional 
variable ICRG is included, as this is only available from the beginning of the 1980s onwards. 
Another issue is the policy variable, where I use an entirely different measure than they do. 
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 If all dummy variables are included, we have perfect collinearity between them, and the estimates become 
meaningless. This is the so-called dummy variable trap. Wooldridge (2006:837) defines the dummy variable trap 
like this: “The mistake of including too many dummy variables among the independent variables; it occurs when 
an overall intercept is in the model and a dummy variable is included for each group.” Normally Stata will make 
sure this is implemented automatically by excluding one of the dummies if all are included. 
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There are also large discrepancies between the two datasets in terms of the countries included. 
Collier & Dollar (2002) have 59 countries in their regressions, whereof 39 are also in my 
dataset. Out of the twenty countries lacking in my dataset nine are Eastern European countries 
that have been reclassified in the DAC system and are no longer recipients of ODA.
24
 Another 
five lack data for the institutional variable,
25
 two lack data for the policy variable
26
 and the 
four remaining do not have data on initial GNI or GNI per capita growth.
27
 
All of this reduces the purpose of running regressions with an “original” set of countries and 
periods to try to replicate the results of Collier & Dollar (2002). In addition to the 39 countries 
that are common to their dataset and mine, my data includes 41 more countries.  
 
8.2 Regression results 
I have been running regressions with different specifications of the growth equation and 
different aid variables and observations included. The intention of this has been to test the 
robustness of the results, which turn out to vary considerably. 
I run four different specifications of the growth equation, starting by including only initial 
GNI and the regional and time dummies in addition to the aid variables. This is the 
specification referred to as number 1 in the tables, with the prefix FE (fixed effects), RE 
(random effects) or OLS (ordinary least square). Specification 2 includes the policy variable 
and the variable for institutional quality, both of which are expected to have positive effects 
on growth. Specification 3 also includes an interaction term of the aid variable with policy to 
account for the possibility that the effect of aid on growth is contingent upon the level of 
policy, which is the main result of Burnside & Dollar (2000) and Collier & Dollar (2002). The 
latter include an interaction term of aid with institutional quality as a sensitivity check to the 
estimates of their policy–aid interaction term. This is done in specification 4. I run all models 
with three different estimators: OLS, FE and RE. Here I post the results from the fixed effects 
estimations, as these are the ones I will use for further calculations. Table 8.1 shows 
specifications 1 to 4 for fixed effects, and in table 8.2 I post the three different estimators for 
specification 4 so that the results can be easily compared. The rest of the results for OLS and 
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 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia and Slovakia. 
25
 Lesotho, Rwanda, Kyrgyz Republic, Mauritania and Nepal. 
26
 Chile and Turkmenistan. 
27
 Niger, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Jamaica. 
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random effects will be briefly mentioned in the following, and the tables can be found in 
Appendix H. 
In the first group of regressions I use the aid variable that I assume comes closest to the one 
used by Collier & Dollar (2002). This is net ODA disbursements divided by real PPP GDP 
per capita. In the following this variable is referred to as CDaid. I find this aid measure to be a 
bit arbitrary, as it is difficult to get a grasp of what it is actually measuring.  Therefore the 
results I use for further calculations are from regressions using a different aid variable: ODA 
as a percentage of GDP, henceforth ODA/GDP percent. One reason for preferring this 
measure is that it is easily understandable. Lensink & White (2000) use a variation of this aid 
variable,
28
 and other important studies apply the share of ODA to GDP (Hansen & Tarp, 
2001; Rajan & Subramanian, 2008). Thus it seems like a reasonable alternative.  
There are large differences between the two aid variables, and the correlation between them is 
a mere 0.26. I therefore expect that using the different variables has consequences for the 
results. I also run tests to identify potential outliers, and excluding these from the regressions 
has large implications for the statistical significance of the estimates. All results related to the 
CDaid variable and the regressions excluding outliers and observations at the country level 
are posted in Appendix H. 
 
8.2.1 Different aid variables – different outcomes 
In fixed effects estimations with the CDaid variable, aid appears not to have any impact on 
growth in per capita GNI, as none of the two aid terms are statistically significant. They even 
enter the regression with the “wrong” signs; negative for the linear term and positive for the 
quadratic one. The interaction term between aid and policy is however statistically significant 
at the ten percent level, and with a positive coefficient. This is in line with the results of 
Burnside & Dollar (2000) and Collier & Dollar (2002), who claim that the effect of aid on 
growth is contingent upon the policy environment. Initial GNI, policy and institutional quality 
are all statistically significant and with the expected signs in the specifications where they are 
included. Regarding RE and OLS, neither of these estimators give statistically significant 
coefficients for the aid terms related to this aid variable. Institutional quality is significant and 
positive for all three estimators. Using RE estimation, initial GNI and policy are also 
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 Lensink & White (2000) apply ODA as percentage of GNI as the aid variable in their growth regressions. 
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significant and with the expected signs. As these are not the results I use for my further 
calculations, they are posted in Appendix H. 
When estimating the same specifications using the second aid variable, ODA/GDP percent, 
the results are very different. The FE results are posted in Table 8.1 below, and the ones 
comparing FE4 to OLS4 and RE4 are found in Table 8.2. In the tables asterisks indicate the 
statistical significance of the estimated coefficients, with three asterisks for the one percent 
level, two for the five percent level and one asterisk for significance at the ten percent level. 
Standard errors are shown in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates. 
 
Table 8.1: Fixed effects regression results, calculated with robust standard errors. 
Dependent variable: Growth in per capita GNI. Aid variable: ODA/GDP percent. 
 
 FE1 FE2 FE3 FE4 
Log Initial GNI -1.681 -3.300*** -3.285*** -3.169*** 
 (1.053) (1.010) (0.998) (1.101) 
ODA/GDP percent 0.307*** 0.194** 0.182** 0.312** 
 (0.103) (0.095) (0.089) (0.136) 
(ODA/GDP percent)^2 -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Period 4 -1.146** 1.306* 1.289* 1.274* 
 (0.536) (0.665) (0.674) (0.673) 
Period 5 -1.713** 1.556* 1.536* 1.483* 
 (0.697) (0.791) (0.803) (0.803) 
Period 6 0.206 2.573*** 2.534*** 2.443*** 
 (0.588) (0.698) (0.725) (0.765) 
Period 7 -0.145 1.657*** 1.615** 1.470** 
 (0.322) (0.621) (0.642) (0.714) 
Period 8 1.491*** 3.695*** 3.639*** 3.476*** 
 (0.386) (0.715) (0.740) (0.810) 
Period 9 1.820*** 4.015*** 3.963*** 3.801*** 
 (0.512) (0.796) (0.821) (0.916) 
Policy  0.506** 0.587** 0.597** 
  (0.238) (0.277) (0.276) 
Institutional quality (ICRG)  4.161** 4.162** 5.685*** 
  (1.631) (1.651) (2.035) 
Policy x ODA/GDP percent   -0.018 -0.024 
   (0.023) (0.023) 
ICRG x ODA/GDP percent    -0.347 
    (0.243) 
R
2
 0.132 0.301 0.302 0.309 
Observations 783 431 431 431 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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FE estimation gives statistically significant coefficients both for ODA/GDP percent and 
ODA/GDP percent squared, with the expected signs; positive for the linear term and negative 
for the squared. This suggests that aid (measured in this way) does have a positive impact on 
economic growth, with diminishing returns. The squared aid term is significant at the one 
percent level, and the estimates remain almost the same (-0.003 or -0.004) through all 
specifications. The estimates for the linear aid term vary more. We can especially note that it 
makes a jump from 0.182 to 0.312 once its interaction term with institutional quality is 
included. The interaction term is however not statistically significant. This result may be due 
to collinearity between the aid variable and the interaction term. The correlation between 
them is 0.88, which is high. Stata normally excludes variables from the regressions if 
collinearity is considered to be a problem.  
The policy interaction term with aid is insignificant in both specifications. These results are 
thereby in line with Hansen & Tarp (2004), Lensink & White (2001) and others who find that 
aid has a significant, positive effect on growth, regardless of the policy environment. OLS and 
RE estimations still give insignificant coefficients for all aid variables included, as well as for 
the interaction terms. Institutional quality has a large, positive and highly significant 
coefficient for all estimators, and for OLS many of the regional dummies are also significant. 
Notably Eastern Europe and East Asia enter with positive coefficients and the Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Caribbean and Pacific regional dummies all have significant negative coefficients. 
 
Table 8.2: Regression results, different models, calculated with robust standard errors. 
Dependent variable: Growth in per capita GNI. Aid variable: ODA/GDP percent. 
 OLS4 RE4 FE4 
Log Initial GNI -0.384 -0.682** -3.169*** 
 (0.302) (0.301) (1.101) 
Policy 0.113 0.254 0.597** 
 (0.201) (0.218) (0.276) 
ODA/GDP percent 0.326 0.404 0.312** 
 (0.276) (0.284) (0.136) 
(ODA/GDP percent)^2 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Policy x ODA/GDP percent 0.006 0.007 -0.024 
 (0.027) (0.023) (0.023) 
Institutional quality (ICRG) 6.568*** 6.337*** 5.685*** 
 (1.952) (2.029) (2.035) 
ICRG x ODA/GDP percent -0.543 -0.639 -0.347 
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 (0.475) (0.407) (0.243) 
Eastern Europe 2.638** 1.984 . 
 (1.151) (2.375) . 
Latin America -0.662 -0.935 . 
 (0.533) (2.211) . 
North Africa and Middle East -0.685 -1.057 . 
 (0.499) (2.215) . 
Sub-Saharan Africa -2.417*** -2.938 . 
 (0.833) (2.261) . 
East Asia 4.945*** 4.543* . 
 (0.677) (2.395) . 
South-East Asia 0.695 0.246 . 
 (0.750) (2.261) . 
South Asia 0.455 -0.281 . 
 (0.860) (2.281) . 
Pacific -3.249*** -4.145 . 
 (0.618) (3.137) . 
Caribbean -1.281** -1.514 . 
 (0.544) (3.071) . 
Period 4 1.282** 1.303** 1.274* 
 (0.609) (0.603) (0.673) 
Period 5 1.191* 1.276** 1.483* 
 (0.680) (0.639) (0.803) 
Period 6 2.211*** 2.304*** 2.443*** 
 (0.661) (0.547) (0.765) 
Period 7 1.155** 1.206** 1.470** 
 (0.526) (0.540) (0.714) 
Period 8 3.447*** 3.336*** 3.476*** 
 (0.685) (0.623) (0.810) 
Period 9 3.212*** 3.197*** 3.801*** 
 (0.601) (0.568) (0.916) 
R
2
 0.327  0.309 
Observations 431 431 431 
 
 
8.2.2 Sensitivity of the results 
Since growth regressions of this kind are known not to be very robust to changes in 
specification and outliers, I run some regressions excluding observations at the country level 
and some excluding outliers. This turns out to have large consequences for the statistical 
significance of the estimates. 
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Excluding observations at the country level 
In the regressions with different numbers of countries in the sample I start out with a sample 
of 66 countries (group 1), based on excluding 14 countries that are in my dataset but not 
present in the poverty-efficient allocation of Collier & Dollar (2002). I group the excluded 
countries into groups of one, two or three based on geography and other characteristics that 
make them similar, and expand the sample by including increasingly more groups of countries 
in the regressions. The groups of countries are listed in Table 8.3 below.  
 
Table 8.3: Groups of countries subsequently added to regressions 
Group Country 
2 Albania, Croatia, Serbia 
3 Oman, Saudi Arabia 
4 Cyprus, Malta 
5 Iran, Lebanon, Syria 
6 Liberia, Sudan 
7 Singapore 
8 Bahamas 
 
For the CDaid variable the coefficient of the interaction term between aid and policy is 
positive and significant all the way up to 80 countries. None of the other aid terms are found 
to be significantly different from zero in any sample of countries.  
Doing the same using the second aid variable, ODA/GDP percent, the effect of the aid 
variables remains significant all the way up to 80 countries, with only minor changes in the 
coefficients. The coefficient of ODA/GDP percent ranges from 0.255 with 78 countries in the 
sample to 0.312 with all 80 countries included. The coefficient of the quadratic term remains 
quite constant at -0.003 and -0,004. Both aid coefficients are statistically significant for all 
subsamples of countries. One peculiar observation is that in the smaller samples, the 
interaction term between aid and institutional quality is statistically significant and negative 
for the ODA/GDP percent variable. This is an unexpected occurrence because of the strong 
positive relation between growth and institutional quality, both in the literature and in my 
regressions. The seemingly negative relation could possibly be explained by interpreting the 
growth equation in a different way. Simplifying the growth equation to include only terms 
with aid and institutions, 
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          AIAAIXcG 5
2
4321    
This could be rewritten as  2
43521 )( AAIAXcG      (8.2) 
Equation (8.2) shows that the interaction term can be interpreted in two different ways: the 
effect of aid on growth is dependent on the quality of institutions – or the effect of institutions 
on growth is dependent on the level of aid a country receives.  
In the latter case the negative interaction between aid and the institutional variable could 
represent the effect of institutions on growth in the presence of (more) aid, and conclude that 
aid has a negative impact on the ability of institutions to foster growth. For instance one could 
imagine that the government of a country, in order to please donors, “improves” institutions in 
a way that is neither lasting nor deep, and thus would not have the desired effect on growth. 
 
Outliers   
To check the robustness of the regression results it is also useful to identify potential outliers 
for the aid variables and for economic growth that could be driving the results in a certain 
direction. For this I apply the so-called Hadi method which has its own Stata command.  
For ODA/GDP percent the Hadi method identifies five outliers where aid receipts amount to 
between 38.96 and 85.84 percent of the recipient country’s GDP. These are listed in table 8.4 
below and include Gambia, Liberia, Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo.  
 
Table 8.4: Hadi outliers for the ODA/GDP percent variable 
Country Period 
Gambia 1986-1989 
Liberia 2006-2009 
 Mozambique 1990-1993 1994-1997 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2002-2005 
 
Once excluding these five observations, all of the aid terms in the FE regressions are rendered 
insignificant. This is a sign that the coefficients are highly sensitive to small changes, and 
likely to be driven by a few observations. I choose to proceed using the results I got in table 
8.1, bearing in mind that they cannot be taken as a solid basis for the further calculations or 
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for policy recommendations. Growth regressions of this kind are known not to be very robust 
to changes in specification. This result should therefore not come as a surprise, although it is 
unfortunate. 
Table 8.5: Hadi outliers for CDaid 
Country  Period 
     Bangladesh 1986-1989 1990-1993 1994-1997 
  China 1986-1989 1990-1993 
   Egypt 1990-1993 
    Ethiopia 1990-1993 1994-1997 1998-2001 2002-2005 2006-2009 
India 1982-1985 1986-1989 1990-1993 
  Mozambique 1986-1989 1990-1993 1994-1997 1998-2001 2002-2005 2006-2009 
Tanzania 1990-1993 1998-2001 2002-2005 2006-2009 
 Congo, Dem. Rep. 2002-2005 2006-2009 
    
This list of CDaid outliers in table 8.5 looks quite different than the one associated with the 
ODA/GDP percent variable, and includes as much as 26 observations. Several more countries 
are included here, but two of the outliers for the other aid variable are not among them. 
Excluding these outliers from the FE4 model does not change the significance of the aid 
terms, but it does make the interaction term between aid and policy insignificant. It thereby 
turns out that every positive effect of aid on growth detected in regressions for either aid 
variable is rendered insignificant when excluding the outliers that receive a large amount of 
aid relative to their GDP.  
There are also some outliers for the GNI per capita growth variable. More precisely, the Hadi 
method identifies two such observations at the ten percent level. These are Liberia for the 
period 2002-2005 and Azerbaijan for the period 2006-2009, with growth rates of 35.7 and 
19.7 percent respectively.  
Table 8.6: Growth outliers 
Country Period GNI per capita growth 
Azerbaijan 2006-2009 19.74 
Liberia 2002-2005 35.72 
 
For ODA/GDP percent the coefficients of the aid variables become insignificant once 
excluding these two observations. The positive coefficient for the CDaid interaction term with 
policy is robust to the exclusion of the growth outliers, now even significant at the five 
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percent level. The results from the last round of regressions show that the coefficients are 
much more sensitive to single extreme observations than to changes of the sample at the 
country level, which is in line with the results of Burnside & Dollar (2000). The tables 
showing the results of these exercises are posted in Appendix H. 
In addition to confirming the sensitivity of the results to small changes my regressions also 
highlight the significance of the aid variable used, as the two variables give very different 
results. 
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9 The poverty-efficient allocation of aid 
I now have sufficient data to construct the poverty-efficient allocation of aid for 2010. In this 
chapter I make an assumption about the elasticity of poverty reduction with respect to income 
growth. This, together with the regression results and data on per capita income and poverty 
rates, enables me to calculate the optimal aid receipts of each country in the allocation. 
Different versions of the poverty-efficient allocation are constructed, showing the impact of 
using different poverty measures and elasticities. The benchmark allocation is then compared 
to actual aid disbursements for the same year, with a special emphasis on Norway. 
 
9.1 The elasticity of poverty reduction with respect to income growth 
As an estimate of the poverty-elasticity of growth Collier & Dollar (2002) use the median 
value of the elasticities in Ravallion & Chen (1997). They investigate the relationship 
between headcount poverty and mean income in a large sample of countries and conclude 
with an estimate of 2.
29
 Lensink & White (2000) choose the same approach. I have used the 
value of 2 for constructing the poverty-efficient allocation related to the headcount measures, 
and also experimented with a lower value in order to account for recent developments in 
estimates from the literature (Lenagala & Ram, 2010). As long as the elasticity is the same for 
every country, this exercise results in the exact same allocation. This makes sense, as the 
relative relationship among countries is not affected by the change of elasticity.  
In reality these elasticities will vary significantly across countries, especially depending on 
their income distributions. Country-specific elasticities are however not available in large 
samples. Collier & Dollar (2002, p. 1493) estimate some country-specific elasticities related 
to the poverty gap, pg, and squared poverty gap, spg. These are calculated on the basis of the 
relationship between the different poverty measures. The elasticity associated with the 
poverty gap is given by:  
 pg
hpg
pg

 , 
 
 
 
where h is the headcount ratio. For an elasticity that can be applied with the squared poverty 
gap they use the following equation: 
                                                 
29
 This is the absolute value of the elasticity. In reality this elasticity will be negative, since an increase in mean 
income reduces the poverty rate.  
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 spg
pgspg
spg

  
 
 
 
By applying these elasticities and their corresponding poverty measures, their significance for 
the outcome of the poverty-efficient allocation can be detected. Collier & Dollar (2002) find 
small differences between the allocations calculated with individual elasticities and the one 
calculated using the constant elasticity of 2 for every country. The poverty headcount ratio 
and poverty gaps that will be used for calculating the allocations are posted in Table 9.1 
below together with their accompanying elasticity measures.
30
  
 
Table 9.1: Headcount ratio, poverty gap and elasticities for $2 and $1.25 poverty lines, 
latest available poverty data 
Country Poverty rates, $2 Elasticities, $2 Poverty rates, $1.25 Elasticities, $1.25 
  hc % pov.gap% hc pov.gap hc % pov.gap% hc pov.gap 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 94.46 65.75 2 0.44 86.15 50.47 2 0.71 
Burundi 93.16 55.37 2 0.68 80.58 35.56 2 1.27 
Liberia 94.65 58.98 2 0.60 83.06 40.14 2 1.07 
Malawi 87.47 46.9 2 0.87 67.34 27.29 2 1.47 
Niger 75.23 30.83 2 1.44 43.62 12.42 2 2.51 
Sierra Leone 69.33 31.51 2 1.20 44.74 15.38 2 1.91 
Madagascar 89.35 51.5 2 0.73 71.62 33.07 2 1.17 
Mozambique 81.77 42.86 2 0.91 59.58 25.13 2 1.37 
Central African Republic 80.09 46.78 2 0.71 62.83 31.26 2 1.01 
Tanzania 87.33 46.75 2 0.87 66.76 27.34 2 1.44 
Rwanda 84.75 48.3 2 0.75 67.66 30.62 2 1.21 
Ethiopia 53.61 15.17 2 2.53 15.98 2.88 2 4.55 
Guinea 68.66 30.32 2 1.26 42.29 14.44 2 1.93 
Guinea-Bissau 77.28 34.27 2 1.26 47.97 16.1 2 1.98 
Uganda 70.57 31.67 2 1.23 44.41 15.3 2 1.90 
Burkina Faso 73.06 32.04 2 1.28 45.06 14.83 2 2.04 
Togo 69.17 27.82 2 1.49 38.52 11.3 2 2.41 
Mali 77.84 35.85 2 1.17 50.96 17.58 2 1.90 
Nepal 64.96 24.62 2 1.64 33.9 8.95 2 2.79 
Haiti 78.88 48.39 2 0.63 63.58 33.94 2 0.87 
Bangladesh 78.43 32.22 2 1.43 46.62 12.53 2 2.72 
Benin 73.34 31.82 2 1.30 44.79 14.48 2 2.09 
Chad 70.99 32.15 2 1.21 44.86 15.85 2 1.83 
Timor-Leste 70.61 25.37 2 1.78 34.7 7.9 2 3.39 
                                                 
30
 I also made allocations based on the squared poverty gap and its accompanying elasticity. Due to spatial 
considerations I do not post these results here. It could be noted that the allocation came closer to the allocation 
using the headcount poverty measure than the one using the poverty gap.  
9 The poverty-efficient allocation of aid  
64 
 
Comoros 66.44 35.39 2 0.88 47.72 21.83 2 1.19 
Gambia, The 54.26 23.3 2 1.33 32.12 10.95 2 1.93 
Kenya 64.55 29.77 2 1.17 40.58 15.44 2 1.63 
Nigeria 84.03 48.84 2 0.72 66.46 32.17 2 1.07 
Cambodia 53.27 17.41 2 2.06 22.75 4.87 2 3.67 
Zambia 80.97 49.88 2 0.62 66.27 35.04 2 0.89 
Pakistan 60.19 17.94 2 2.36 21.04 3.49 2 5.03 
Lao PDR 66 24.83 2 1.66 33.88 8.95 2 2.79 
Lesotho 55.98 28.66 2 0.95 37.64 17.43 2 1.16 
India 72.42 27.07 2 1.68 37.37 9.02 2 3.14 
Senegal 50.23 18.86 2 1.66 25.19 7.3 2 2.45 
Papua New Guinea 63.81 30.27 2 1.11 42.47 15.95 2 1.66 
Mauritania 47.69 17.66 2 1.70 23.43 6.79 2 2.45 
Cote d'Ivoire 46.34 17.79 2 1.60 23.75 7.5 2 2.17 
Tajikistan 32.2 9.55 2 2.37 10.73 2.65 2 3.05 
Sao Tome and Principe 43.74 14.98 2 1.92 19.88 4.66 2 3.27 
Yemen, Rep. 46.02 14.5 2 2.17 17.13 4.08 2 3.20 
Vietnam 43.36 13.53 2 2.20 16.85 3.75 2 3.49 
Ghana 46.66 18.52 2 1.52 24.64 8.2 2 2.00 
Sudan 44.99 15.77 2 1.85 20.37 5.66 2 2.60 
Cameroon 30.01 8.07 2 2.72 9.31 1.14 2 7.17 
Congo, Rep. 73.82 38.27 2 0.93 53.37 22.33 2 1.39 
Kyrgyz Republic 20.74 5.92 2 2.50 6.39 1.51 2 3.23 
Nicaragua 25.83 7.06 2 2.66 8.11 1.37 2 4.92 
Philippines 42.21 14.35 2 1.94 19.4 4.14 2 3.69 
Swaziland 66.59 34.08 2 0.95 47.1 19.83 2 1.38 
Indonesia 54.4 17.67 2 2.08 22.64 4.73 2 3.79 
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 45.8 25.25 2 0.81 32.05 16.84 2 0.90 
Angola 71.64 43.62 2 0.64 55.9 31.06 2 0.80 
Honduras 32.61 17.47 2 0.87 21.36 11.75 2 0.82 
Bhutan 28.38 7.96 2 2.57 9.34 1.59 2 4.87 
Bolivia 24.89 13.05 2 0.91 15.61 8.64 2 0.81 
Georgia 32.21 11.73 2 1.75 15.27 4.57 2 2.34 
Sri Lanka 26.43 6.38 2 3.14 5.55 0.72 2 6.71 
Guatemala 25.86 10.22 2 1.53 13.17 4.58 2 1.88 
Namibia 42.9 15.99 2 1.68 23.05 5.26 2 3.38 
Cape Verde 26.3 7.88 2 2.34 10.55 2.21 2 3.77 
Iraq 18.69 3.68 2 4.08 2.15 0.32 2 5.72 
China 29.79 10.06 2 1.96 13.06 3.24 2 3.03 
Belize 23.98 10.68 2 1.25 13.3 5.95 2 1.24 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 15.43 2.84 2 4.43 1.69 0.38 2 3.45 
Fiji 20.97 5.32 2 2.94 5.01 0.96 2 4.22 
Guyana 16.64 6.11 2 1.72 7.94 2.45 2 2.24 
Paraguay 13.56 4.8 2 1.83 5.59 2.12 2 1.64 
St. Lucia 32.53 11.71 2 1.78 15.79 5.16 2 2.06 
Morocco 12.18 2.68 2 3.54 2.06 0.45 2 3.58 
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South Africa 31.12 10.04 2 2.10 13.56 2.24 2 5.05 
Moldova 6.91 1.44 2 3.80 1.05 0.26 2 3.04 
Armenia 12.43 2.27 2 4.48 1.28 0.25 2 4.12 
El Salvador 14.03 4.78 2 1.94 5.44 1.85 2 1.94 
Botswana 26.22 8.99 2 1.92 11.92 2.81 2 3.24 
Colombia 20.89 9.64 2 1.17 11.32 5.77 2 0.96 
Ecuador 13.02 5.48 2 1.38 6.45 3.06 2 1.11 
Algeria 13.91 3.25 2 3.28 2.73 0.52 2 4.25 
Peru 14.81 5 2 1.96 6.2 1.76 2 2.52 
Syrian Arab Republic 6.75 0.96 2 6.03 0.26 0.04 2 5.50 
Suriname 19.32 7.72 2 1.50 10.2 3.47 2 1.94 
Dominican Republic 11.08 3.07 2 2.61 3.3 0.82 2 3.02 
Panama 15.79 6.01 2 1.63 7.45 2.69 2 1.77 
Gabon 13.53 3.09 2 3.38 2.49 0.45 2 4.53 
Tunisia 5.56 1.15 2 3.83 0.83 0.18 2 3.61 
Albania 4.25 0.85 2 4.00 0.62 0.19 2 2.26 
Thailand 4.98 0.81 2 5.15 0.37 0.04 2 8.25 
Brazil 11.32 5.3 2 1.14 6.01 3.43 2 0.75 
Maldives 6.74 1.06 2 5.36 0.22 0.02 2 10.00 
Macedonia, FYR 4.26 0.7 2 5.09 0.29 0.04 2 6.25 
Jamaica 4.41 0.63 2 6.00 0.13 0.01 2 12.00 
Venezuela, RB 9.32 4.72 2 0.97 5.14 3.27 2 0.57 
Costa Rica 4.99 2.3 2 1.17 2.42 1.47 2 0.65 
Mexico 5.19 1.29 2 3.02 1.15 0.34 2 2.38 
Jordan 2.11 0.25 2 7.44 0.07 0.01 2 6.00 
Azerbaijan 2.81 0.57 2 3.93 0.43 0.14 2 2.07 
Turkey 4.16 0.74 2 4.62 - - 2 - 
Argentina 3.66 1.65 2 1.22 1.94 1.02 2 0.90 
Turkmenistan 1.49 0.22 2 5.77 0.11 0.02 2 4.50 
Malaysia 1.92 0.11 2 16.45 - - 2 - 
Seychelles 2.5 0.46 2 4.43 0.32 0.09 2 2.56 
Chile 2.68 1.07 2 1.50 1.24 0.6 2 1.07 
Uruguay 1.91 0.37 2 4.16 0.26 0.05 2 4.20 
Serbia 0.65 0.16 2 3.06 0.14 0.06 2 1.33 
Kazakhstan 0.89 0.16 2 4.56 0.1 0.03 2 2.33 
Trinidad and Tobago 1.46 0.4 2 2.65 0.38 0.15 2 1.53 
Montenegro 0.3 0.12 2 1.50 0.12 0.08 2 0.50 
Ukraine 0.13 0.04 2 2.25 0.04 0.02 2 1.00 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.15 0.04 2 2.75 0.04 0.02 2 1.00 
Belarus 0.19 0.12 2 0.58 0.1 0.1 2 0.00 
Croatia 0.09 0.09 2 0.00 0.06 0.06 2 0.00 
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9.2 The marginal effect of aid on economic growth 
The purpose of running the regressions is to find the marginal effect of aid on growth, which 
is needed for the next step of the analysis. As already mentioned, my regressions give 
different results, especially depending on the aid variable used. The most important thing for 
the construction of the poverty-efficient allocation is that A
i
 is present in the marginal effect 
of aid on growth. This means that the coefficient of the quadratic term in the regression must 
be statistically significant. If this is not the case it is not possible to solve for each country’s 
aid receipts. This implies using the results connected to the ODA/GDP percent variable. This 
also implies not having a significant coefficient for the interaction term between aid and 
policy, which is one of the main results in Collier & Dollar (2002).  
The main results of the growth regression I will be using for my further calculations (FE4) are 
the following:  
i) I find a positive, significant effect of aid on economic growth. 
ii) This effect is subject to diminishing returns, as the coefficient of the quadratic aid 
term is negative. 
iii) The coefficient of the interaction term between policy and aid is not statistically 
significant. This implies that the effect of aid on economic growth is independent 
of policy.  
It is perfectly possible to construct a poverty-efficient aid allocation without the policy term 
present in the allocation rule. The quadratic aid term is the one of crucial importance here. 
Lensink & White (2000) do so, and their allocation differs from Collier & Dollar’s in two 
important ways:  
i) It is more sharply targeted to poor countries, since policy is not included in the 
allocation rule. Poverty is thereby assigned more weight in determining aid 
receipts.  
ii) More aid is allocated to each country that is fortunate to receive some, and this 
implies fewer eligible recipient countries. This is due to a considerably lower 
coefficient of the quadratic term, which means that the effect of diminishing 
returns kicks in at a later point. 
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The allocations are quite similar however; many of the same countries receive large amounts 
of aid in both allocations, and the rank correlation
31
 between them is high (Lensink & White, 
2000, p. 409).  
From equation (4.5), when excluding the policy term, we have the following expression for 
the marginal effect of aid on growth in per capita GNI: 
 
 
i
a AG 43 2   
 
 
Using the estimates from FE4 this equals:  
   
 
 
i
a AG 008.0312.0    
Comparing this marginal effect to those of the two other studies, the marginal effect of Collier 
& Dollar (2002, p. 1497) is:  
 i
a AG 0.02-0.54-0.31P   
 
Lensink & White (2000, p. 406) use the following estimate: 
 i
a AG 0.0035 -0.1736   
 
As seen from these equations my regression results are much closer to those of Lensink & 
White (2000) than the ones by Collier & Dollar (2002), especially with respect to the 
quadratic term. Because of the similarity of the coefficients I would expect my allocation to 
be somewhat in line with theirs. It should also be kept in mind that poverty rates and GDP per 
capita levels may have changed considerably during the past ten to fifteen years. Therefore it 
would not be strange if the allocations were somewhat different. The main purpose of making 
the allocation is however not to compare it to the poverty-efficient allocations of others. It is 
more interesting to compare it to the current aid allocation by donors, and in particular to the 
allocation of Norwegian aid across recipient countries.  
 
                                                 
31
 The Spearman rank correlation is a correlation coefficient that is calculated based on the ranking of 
observations, not on the basis of their absolute values. 
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9.3 The allocation rule 
Since my aid variable in the regressions is ODA as percentage of GDP, the budget constraint 
of the maximization problem needs to be modified in order to give the dollar amount of aid. 
The maximization problem from chapter 4 thus becomes:  
Max poverty reduction 
i
iiii NhG    
Subject to   
i
iii
A
NyA
100
, 0iA  
 
The first order condition is almost the same as before, but with one important difference, 
namely that the last part is divided by 100: 
 
0
100

ii
iiii
a
Ny
NhG

  
 
 
Inserting for the marginal effect of aid on growth gives the following allocation rule
32
 for 
poverty-efficient aid: 
 
ii
i
i
h
y
A




10022 44
3    
 
This is a less complex allocation rule than the one derived in the modeling chapter. Here, 
poverty-efficient aid receipts are determined by only two factors; per capita income, y
i
, and 
poverty level, h
i
. The coefficients from the regression, the shadow value of aid, , and the 
elasticity of poverty reduction with respect to income growth, i , are the same for every 
country. When inserting the coefficients from the FE4 growth regression into the allocation 
rule for poverty-efficient aid, I end up with the following expression: 
 
 
 









i
i
i
h
y
A 25.139  
 
(9.1) 
                                                 
32
 The derivation of this expression is posted in Appendix B. 
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This is my allocation rule for poverty-efficient aid. Intuitively it makes sense that countries 
with a low per capita income and high rates of poverty should be receiving more aid and the 
other way around, as is apparent from the equation. The constant term gives the maximum 
value of A
i
, which is the percentage of its own GDP that a country could receive in aid. This 
point is determined by setting the derivative of the growth equation with respect to aid equal 
to zero and solving for A
i
. Looking at the second order derivative, which is 02 4  , I know 
that this point gives the maximum of the function. A larger A
i
 than this will imply that aid 
starts to have a negative impact on the growth rate.  
 
9.4 Constructing the allocation 
From here I can insert data for the poverty elasticity of growth, the poverty rate and per capita 
income. This will however not provide me with the solution directly because the unknown 
shadow value of aid,  , is still in the expression. I thus end up with a set of equations, one for 
each country, which should be calculated simultaneously using the budget constraint: 
 
 
 
i
iii
A
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100  
 
 
Summing all expressions for Ai and inserting them into the budget constraint together with 
figures for the total aid budget, I can now calculate the value of  . This   will not be the 
correct one, because the non-negativity constraint imposed on each Ai also needs to be taken 
into account. This is implemented in an Excel spreadsheet, inserting   back into the Ai of 
each country. Some countries, notably the ones having the largest ratio of 
i
i
h
y
, will now be 
allocated a negative amount of aid. The optimal A
i
 for these countries is thereby 0. By 
removing the countries with a negative A
i
 from the budget constraint and calculating  again I 
can continue allocating the same size aid budget across a smaller number of countries. 
Repeating this exercise, the allocation eventually converges, and in the end all the remaining 
countries receive a positive amount of aid. This is the poverty-efficient allocation of aid. 
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9.5 The poverty-efficient allocation of aid  
In the following I go with the approach of Collier & Dollar (2002) and Lensink & White 
(2000) and use the $2 poverty line as the benchmark against which the other allocations are 
assessed. Calculating the poverty-efficient allocation using the $2 headcount poverty measure, 
32 out of 111 countries in the dataset are found to be eligible for aid receipts. The rest of the 
countries receive 0 in the optimal allocation. This is posted in Table 9.2 below. In order to 
make the table more readable I post only the first part of it here, including the first few 
countries that are allocated 0. The ordering of countries is identical to the ordering in Table 
9.1 and Table 9.4. The complete table for the poverty-efficient allocation is posted in 
Appendix I.  
 
Table 9.2: Poverty-efficient allocation for different poverty measures in 2010 
Country Benchmark allocation, $2 hc Poverty-efficient allocation, % of recipient GDP 
  % of GDP $ million $2 pov.gap $1.25 hc $1.25 pov.gap 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 34.41 4511.03 30.61 35.70 34.30 
Burundi 33.34 675.72 31.25 34.71 34.46 
Liberia 33.30 328.96 30.60 34.74 34.13 
Malawi 30.54 1543.57 28.87 31.80 31.85 
Niger 28.89 1562.86 29.48 27.57 29.56 
Sierra Leone 28.76 549.22 28.57 28.60 29.64 
Madagascar 28.72 2504.63 25.52 30.59 29.78 
Mozambique 28.50 2624.31 26.74 29.55 29.35 
Central African Republic 26.72 530.25 22.59 28.74 26.94 
Tanzania 25.85 6102.73 23.27 27.72 27.72 
Rwanda 25.37 1427.05 21.40 27.81 26.93 
Ethiopia 24.44 7254.16 27.72 6.98 15.93 
Guinea 23.92 1133.06 24.00 22.96 24.61 
Guinea-Bissau 23.44 195.79 23.46 22.56 24.39 
Uganda 23.09 3971.72 22.97 22.43 24.07 
Burkina Faso 23.00 2029.72 23.17 21.99 24.03 
Togo 22.38 710.88 23.56 19.44 22.65 
Mali 21.82 2055.86 21.30 21.80 23.49 
Nepal 21.05 3370.83 22.94 16.45 20.91 
Haiti 20.64 1369.30 12.61 24.07 20.09 
Bangladesh 20.23 20300.09 21.30 18.30 22.28 
Benin 16.96 1112.08 17.37 15.34 18.35 
Chad 15.62 1334.33 15.26 14.75 16.86 
Timor-Leste 15.34 134.20 18.48 7.43 14.87 
Comoros 14.82 80.19 10.25 16.93 14.98 
Gambia, The 14.57 153.03 15.21 11.95 14.76 
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Kenya 12.14 3908.89 11.30 10.99 12.30 
Nigeria 6.74 13272.04 0 12.27 8.40 
Cambodia 6.44 723.57 12.12 0 1.45 
Zambia 5.25 850.02 0 11.97 5.13 
Pakistan 2.07 3664.81 9.77 0 0 
Lao PDR 0.72 51.69 4.91 0 0 
Lesotho 0 0 0 0.87 0 
India 0 0 0 0 0 
Senegal 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
The largest recipient in terms of the size of A
i
 is the Democratic Republic of Congo, with 34.4 
percent of its own GDP in aid receipts, closely followed by two other countries with 
extremely high poverty rates; Burundi and Liberia. The last country to receive aid in the 
benchmark allocation is Laos, with 0.72 percent of its GDP in aid. In the tables the countries 
are ranked by the ratio of y
i
 to h
i
, from smallest to largest. This means that the countries on 
top of the list are expected to be allocated the largest A
i
, as can be seen from the allocation 
rule in equation (9.1). India, which would by far be the largest recipient in Collier & Dollar’s 
allocation, and whose aid receipts they constrain to its actual level, is one of the first countries 
to receive 0 in my benchmark allocation. This may be partly explained by the country’s 
steady economic growth and poverty reduction the past decade, but could also be due to 
differences in the estimates from the growth regression.
33
 In absolute dollar terms, a few 
populous countries are the largest recipients in the benchmark allocation. These are 
Bangladesh and Nigeria, which combined receive more than one third of the total aid budget 
of $90.4 billion. The dollar amounts are shown for the $2 headcount allocation in table 9.2 
together with aid as percentage of GDP. The share of the total aid budget pertaining to each 
country in the benchmark allocation is shown in table 9.4, where it is compared to the actual 
allocations of donors. I get back to this comparison in section 9.7 
 
9.6 Sensitivity analysis 
I now take a look at what happens when using different poverty measures to calculate the 
poverty-efficient allocation of aid. I am interested in whether applying the $2 poverty gap, the 
                                                 
33
 An extreme allocation using the estimates from the growth regression minus two standard deviations for the 
aid term and plus two standard deviations for the quadratic term gave the same kind of result, with India 
receiving more than half the total aid budget. The results are not posted here. 
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$1.25 headcount ratio or the $1.25 poverty gap changes the allocation in any significant way. 
The benchmark allocation and the three allocations for different poverty measures are posted 
in table 9.2. These modifications do not change the overall picture, but they do have large 
implications for allocations to a few of the countries.  
 
9.6.1 The consequence of country-specific elasticities 
Most of the countries that receive large shares of aid to GDP in the benchmark allocation are 
also allocated a large share using the $2 poverty gap as poverty measure. There are however a 
few notable exceptions. Nigeria, one of the largest recipients of aid in absolute terms using the 
$2 headcount measure receives 0 in the optimal allocation using the corresponding poverty 
gap. The same is the case for Zambia. Pakistan, which receives a rather modest 2.07 percent 
of GDP using the $2 poverty headcount measure, receives 9.77 percent of GDP once 
switching to the poverty gap. This makes it one of the largest recipients in absolute terms. 
Laos and Cambodia are also allocated considerably larger amounts of aid using this poverty 
measure. To find the reason for this, we can look at the sizes of the poverty gaps and the 
elasticities of the countries, and there is our answer.  
Table 9.1 shows that Nigeria and Zambia both have very large poverty gaps and low 
elasticities compared to the three Asian countries mentioned. These two properties make it 
more costly to reduce poverty in Nigeria and Zambia than in Pakistan, Laos or Cambodia. In 
Pakistan, a one percent increase in the rate of economic growth will reduce the poverty rate 
three to four times more than in the two African countries. The poor in Pakistan are also much 
closer to the poverty line, which makes it easier to lift them above it. One should think that 
having a large poverty gap, as is the case for Nigeria and Zambia, would make them eligible 
for aid receipts. However, the same mechanism that makes the poverty gap so large, 
inequality, also has the effect of lowering the elasticity of poverty reduction with respect to 
growth. Recalling that it is the product of these two sizes that enters the denominator of the 
allocation rule, the low elasticity cancels out the effect of a large poverty gap. Other than 
these few exceptions, the allocation is still very much like the benchmark, and the rank 
correlation between the two allocations is as high as 0.97.  
  
9 The poverty-efficient allocation of aid  
73 
 
Table 9.3: Spearman correlation matrix of different poverty-efficient allocations of aid 
 
Benchmark, $2 hc $2 pov.gap $1.25 hc $1.25 pov.gap 
 Benchmark, $2 hc 1 
    $2 pov.gap 0.97 1 
   $1.25 hc 0.95 0.91 1 
  $1.25 pov.gap 0.98 0.95 0.97 1 
 Actual aid 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.62 
  
9.6.2 The significance of the poverty line used 
Of special interest here is also the allocation associated with the $1.25 headcount measure. 
The first of the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goal is to halve the proportion of 
people in the world living below this line by 2015.
34
 Table 9.1 shows that applying this 
measure assigns even more weight to the poorest countries, which receive larger shares of aid 
to GDP than in the benchmark case. One surprising result in this allocation is that Ethiopia is 
allocated only 6.98 percent of its GDP in aid. This is a quite remarkable change from the $2 
headcount allocation where it receives 24.4. This is a result of a large difference between the 
$1.25 and $2 poverty measures for Ethiopia. Whereas more than fifty percent of the 
population lives below the $2 headcount poverty line, the corresponding number for the $1.25 
line is 15.98.
35
  
The aid receipts of Nepal and Timor-Leste are also considerably reduced in this allocation due 
to much lower poverty rates for this measure. The most dramatic change occurs for the largest 
recipients in the $2 poverty gap allocation. Pakistan, Cambodia and Laos all are allocated 0 
using the $1.25 headcount measure. Lesotho is a new country receiving aid in the optimal 
allocation when this poverty line is applied, as its poverty rate for the $1.25 line is 
considerably larger compared to the surrounding countries than its $2 rate. Zambia and 
Nigeria get considerably larger A
i
 in this allocation than in the benchmark allocation, and this 
makes Nigeria the largest recipient in terms of the dollar amount of aid with Bangladesh 
following right behind. Their combined share of the aid budget is even larger in this allocation 
than in the benchmark allocation.  
                                                 
34
 http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/poverty.shtml 
35
 This number is suspiciously low. I have cross-checked the estimates with the PovcalNet database, and these 
are the numbers reported there. The latest estimates reported in WDI are 38.96 for the $1.25 headcount and 
77.63 for $2 headcount. The discrepancy between the two could be due to a large update of poverty rates in 
PovcalNet in February 2012.  
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For the $1.25 poverty gap, the allocation is very similar to the benchmark case, with the 
exceptions of much lower disbursements to Ethiopia and Cambodia. Pakistan and Laos are 
found not to be eligible for aid receipts when using this poverty measure due to their very low 
poverty gaps for the $1.25 poverty line. The two allocations that differ the most are the $2 
poverty gap and the $1.25 headcount allocations, with a rank correlation of 0.91. This 
correlation is still very high. 
For the overall picture the poverty measure used for constructing the poverty-efficient 
allocation does not have a large impact on the ranking of countries or the amounts of aid they 
receive. However, it does make an enormous difference to a few countries. Some actually go 
from being the largest recipients in dollar terms to receiving 0, depending on which poverty 
line and measure is applied when constructing the allocation. 
 
9.7 Comparing the poverty-efficient allocation to actual allocation of ODA 
This whole exercise enables me to finally compare the poverty-efficient allocation to the 
actual allocation of aid across countries. For total aid from all donors, A
i 
can be reasonably 
compared to the poverty-efficient allocation. The first two columns of Table 9.4 show the 
benchmark allocation for the $2 headcount and actual allocation as percentage of recipient 
country GDP. For the rest of the donors; DAC, Norway and multilateral agencies, it makes 
more sense to compare the share of their total aid budgets pertaining to each recipient country 
with the share each country would be allocated in the poverty-efficient allocation. These 
figures are also posted in Table 9.4. One note to the table is that 0 means 0, whereas 0.0 
indicates that the country does receive aid, but a share smaller than 0.05 percent of the total 
budget of the donor. 
The allocations of donors will be compared to the poverty-efficient benchmark allocation by 
calculating the Spearman rank correlation between them. I will briefly comment on which 
countries are over- and underfunded compared to the optimal allocation. Thereafter the 
Norwegian allocation will be devoted special attention. I take a closer look at the largest 
recipient countries and the most distinct differences between the benchmark and the 
Norwegian allocation. As anticipated from the beginning there are some significant 
discrepancies.  
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Table 9.4: Poverty-efficient allocation compared to actual allocations in 2010 
Country Percent of recipient GDP Allocation as percentage of total aid budget 
  Benchmark All donors Benchmark  All donors DAC Norway Multilateral 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 34.41 27.01 5.0 3.9 4.1 1.5 3.9 
Burundi 33.34 31.08 0.8 0.7 0.5 1.0 1.2 
Liberia 33.30 143.66 0.4 1.6 1.2 1.2 2.4 
Malawi 30.54 20.24 1.7 1.1 0.9 3.4 1.7 
Niger 28.89 13.76 1.7 0.8 0.6 0.2 1.2 
Sierra Leone 28.76 24.45 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.9 
Madagascar 28.72 5.39 2.8 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.8 
Mozambique 28.50 21.19 2.9 2.2 2.3 3.9 2.0 
Central African Republic 26.72 13.15 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.5 
Tanzania 25.85 12.53 6.8 3.3 2.8 6.5 4.4 
Rwanda 25.37 18.35 1.6 1.1 0.9 0.2 1.6 
Ethiopia 24.44 11.87 8.1 3.9 3.3 1.7 5.3 
Guinea 23.92 4.60 1.3 0.2 0.2 0 0.4 
Guinea-Bissau 23.44 16.68 0.2 0.2 0.1 0 0.3 
Uganda 23.09 10.02 4.4 1.9 1.8 3.7 2.3 
Burkina Faso 23.00 12.00 2.3 1.2 0.8 0.0 2.0 
Togo 22.38 13.19 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.6 
Mali 21.82 11.55 2.3 1.2 1.2 0.8 1.4 
Nepal 21.05 5.11 3.7 0.9 0.8 2.5 1.2 
Haiti 20.64 46.19 1.5 3.4 4.0 3.5 2.4 
Bangladesh 20.23 1.41 22.5 1.6 1.5 0.9 1.8 
Benin 16.96 10.51 1.2 0.8 0.6 0.0 1.2 
Chad 15.62 5.69 1.5 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.7 
Timor-Leste 15.34 33.31 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.1 
Comoros 14.82 12.42 0.1 0.1 0.0 0 0.1 
Gambia, The 14.57 11.45 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 
Kenya 12.14 5.06 4.3 1.8 2.0 0.7 1.6 
Nigeria 6.74 1.05 14.7 2.3 1.4 0.7 4.1 
Cambodia 6.44 6.53 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.2 0.7 
Zambia 5.25 5.65 0.9 1.0 1.0 2.8 1.1 
Pakistan 2.07 1.70 4.1 3.3 4.1 4.4 1.3 
Lao PDR 0.72 5.76 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.4 
Lesotho 0 11.76 0 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.5 
India 0 0.17 0 3.1 3.8 1.3 2.0 
Senegal 0 7.22 0 1.0 0.9 0.0 1.3 
Papua New Guinea 0 5.39 0 0.6 0.7 0.1 0.2 
Mauritania 0 10.36 0 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.8 
Cote d'Ivoire 0 3.69 0 0.9 0.7 0.1 1.4 
Tajikistan 0 7.61 0 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.9 
Sao Tome and Principe 0 24.52 0 0.1 0.1 0 0.1 
Yemen, Rep. 0 2.14 0 0.7 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Vietnam 0 2.76 0 3.3 3.1 1.1 3.7 
Ghana 0 5.26 0 1.9 1.5 0.2 2.7 
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Sudan 0 3.96 0 2.3 2.6 6.1 1.6 
Cameroon 0 2.40 0 0.6 0.5 0.0 0.9 
Congo, Rep. 0 10.93 0 1.5 2.1 0.0 0.3 
Kyrgyz Republic 0 7.77 0 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 
Nicaragua 0 9.42 0 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.8 
Philippines 0 0.27 0 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.3 
Swaziland 0 2.47 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Indonesia 0 0.20 0 1.5 1.7 2.2 1.4 
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 0 42.09 0 0.1 0.2 0 0.0 
Angola 0 0.29 0 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.3 
Honduras 0 3.74 0 0.6 0.5 0.1 1.0 
Bhutan 0 8.64 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Bolivia 0 3.43 0 0.7 0.8 0.3 0.7 
Georgia 0 5.37 0 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.8 
Sri Lanka 0 1.17 0 0.6 0.7 1.5 0.6 
Guatemala 0 0.95 0 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.1 
Namibia 0 2.30 0 0.3 0.4 -0.2 0.1 
Cape Verde 0 19.76 0 0.4 0.4 0 0.3 
Iraq 0 2.70 0 2.4 3.4 0.4 0.5 
China 0 0.01 0 0.7 1.2 1.2 -0.4 
Belize 0 1.77 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0 0.27 0 0.7 0.6 0.0 0.5 
Fiji 0 2.41 0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Guyana 0 6.78 0 0.2 0.1 1.5 0.3 
Paraguay 0 0.57 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
St. Lucia 0 3.43 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.1 
Morocco 0 1.11 0 1.1 1.0 0.0 1.3 
South Africa 0 0.28 0 1.1 1.4 1.3 0.7 
Moldova 0 8.05 0 0.5 0.2 0.2 1.2 
Armenia 0 3.62 0 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.4 
El Salvador 0 1.32 0 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.2 
Botswana 0 1.05 0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.2 
Colombia 0 0.31 0 1.0 1.3 0.7 0.4 
Ecuador 0 0.26 0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 
Algeria 0 0.12 0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 
Peru 0 -0.17 0 -0.3 -0.5 0.2 0.2 
Syrian Arab Republic 0 0.23 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 
Suriname 0 2.38 0 0.1 0.1 0 0.1 
Dominican Republic 0 0.34 0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.3 
Panama 0 0.48 0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 
Gabon 0 0.79 0 0.1 0.1 0 0.1 
Tunisia 0 1.24 0 0.6 0.6 0 0.7 
Albania 0 2.84 0 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.3 
Thailand 0 0.00 0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.3 
Brazil 0 0.03 0 0.7 1.0 12.9 0.2 
Maldives 0 5.34 0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 
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Macedonia, FYR 0 1.94 0 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 
Jamaica 0 1.02 0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.5 
Venezuela, RB 0 0.01 0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Costa Rica 0 0.26 0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 
Mexico 0 0.05 0 0.5 0.7 0.0 0.2 
Jordan 0 3.61 0 1.1 0.7 0.0 1.5 
Azerbaijan 0 0.29 0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 
Turkey 0 0.14 0 1.2 1.2 0.0 1.0 
Argentina 0 0.03 0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 
Turkmenistan 0 0.22 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Malaysia 0 0.00 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Seychelles 0 5.82 0 0.1 0.0 0 0.0 
Chile 0 0.09 0 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.1 
Uruguay 0 0.12 0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Serbia 0 1.69 0 0.7 0.5 1.1 1.1 
Kazakhstan 0 0.15 0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Trinidad and Tobago 0 0.02 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 
Montenegro 0 1.88 0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 
Ukraine 0 0.46 0 0.7 0.7 0.2 0.6 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0 2.95 0 0.5 0.4 1.0 0.7 
Belarus 0 0.25 0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Croatia 0 0.24 0 0.2 0.4 0 0 
 
 
9.7.1 Number of recipient countries and their shares of the aid budget 
One of the main features of this model is that it will concentrate aid disbursements to a small 
number of countries. As already mentioned only 32 countries receive aid in the benchmark 
allocation whereas the number of recipients of aid from all donors presented here is well over 
one hundred. This in itself is likely to result in inefficiencies in the allocations. Many 
countries that are allocated 0 in the optimal allocation in reality receive large amounts of aid. 
The top recipients in the optimal allocation will be seriously under-funded because policies 
would not allow one third of the total aid budget to be allocated to two countries. Within the 
framework of this model the poverty-efficiency of aid could be increased by reallocating 
disbursements to countries like Bangladesh, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Tanzania or Uganda, which 
receive less than their poverty-efficient amount. The main challenge is that this money would 
then have to be taken from the shares of other countries. In practice this is a very difficult 
task. Countries which receive more than their proportionate share of the budget, or get large 
amounts of aid but should receive 0 in the poverty-efficient allocation include India, Vietnam, 
Sudan, Iraq, China and South Africa. Within the framework of this model the total aid budget 
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is given. In reality this budget is increasing. This could allow the allocation rule to be 
implemented to some degree by letting the increase in the aid budget be allocated to the 
countries where its poverty-reducing potential is largest.  
The largest share allocated to a single country by multilateral donors or DAC is about 5 
percent of the total budget. Ethiopia, Tanzania, Nigeria, DR Congo and Vietnam are among 
the countries receiving the largest shares of the multilateral aid budget, and the only ones 
receiving more than 3 percent of the total aid budget. This is not such a surprise, knowing that 
this budget is spread to well over one hundred countries. DR Congo, Pakistan, India and Iraq 
are the largest recipients in terms of the share of the total DAC budget, in addition to Ethiopia 
and Vietnam.  
The results of the Spearman rank correlation between the different allocations and the 
poverty-efficient one is given in Table 9.5. Norway’s correlation with the benchmark 
allocation, 0.42, is by far the smallest. All the other donors’ allocations are correlated 0.63 or 
higher to the poverty-efficient allocation. This suggests that Norway’s allocation of aid in 
2010 is less in line with the poverty-efficient allocation than the allocation of the DAC donors 
or multilateral agencies. Multilateral aid can reasonably be expected to have higher poverty- 
efficiency than that of bilateral donors because fewer distortions in form of political, 
economic or military self-interest are likely to be involved. The Scandinavian donors in 
general, and Norway in particular, have been known for not letting self-interest guide aid 
disbursements, but rather respond to recipient needs and allocate a large share of their budgets 
to low income countries  (Gates & Hoeffler, 2004). Collier & Dollar (2001b, p.13) found 
Norwegian aid to be about 50 percent more efficient at reducing poverty than average ODA in 
1999. They compared the marginal impact of an additional million dollars in aid when 
allocated proportionately to the allocations of different donors. I will not be doing such an 
exercise, but I note that as it appears here, the allocation of Norwegian aid is now less 
poverty-efficient than aid from the average donor.  
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Table 9.5: Spearman correlation matrix, different donors compared to benchmark 
  Benchmark All donors DAC Norway Multilateral 
Benchmark 1 
    All donors 0.63 1 
   DAC 0.63 0.97 1 
  Norway 0.42 0.45 0.47 1 
 Multilateral 0.64 0.93 0.85 0.47 1 
 
 
9.8 The Norwegian allocation 
I now take a closer look at the Norwegian allocation of aid compared to the poverty-efficient 
benchmark. As already noted the rank correlation between the two allocations is 0.42. The 
number of countries receiving Norwegian aid in 2010 was 113. In the poverty-efficient 
allocation 32 countries are found to be eligible for aid receipts. This is likely to be a large 
source of the apparent inefficiency of the Norwegian allocation, a point also made in the latest 
DAC Peer Review of Norway (Patrick & Taylor, 2009). This does however not explain the 
large difference between the poverty-efficiency of the Norwegian allocation and that of the 
other donors. By the shares of the total budget allocated to the top recipient countries we see 
that Norwegian aid disbursements are more concentrated than DAC or multilateral aid. 
 
9.8.1 Some common large recipient countries 
Table 9.6 below displays the countries receiving the largest shares of the Norwegian bilateral 
aid budget and the top recipients in the poverty-efficient allocation. Four out of the top ten 
recipient countries by share of total aid budget in the benchmark allocation are also among 
Norway’s largest recipients. These are Tanzania, Pakistan, Mozambique and Uganda. The 
shares of the budget they receive in the two allocations are actually quite similar. Two other 
large recipients of Norwegian aid, Malawi and Haiti,
36
 are also among the countries receiving 
aid in the optimal allocation. Malawi is one of the largest recipients in the benchmark 
allocation in terms of the size of ODA to GDP. Norwegian disbursements to this country are 
actually larger than the share it receives in the poverty-efficient allocation. All of this suggests 
that quite a few of the Norwegian top ten are also eligible recipients in the poverty-efficient 
allocation. 
                                                 
36
 The large disbursement to Haiti is due to emergency relief after the earthquake in January 2010. This country 
is not among the largest Norwegian recipient in the years before and after 2010. 
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Table 9.6: Top ten recipients in 2010, percent of total bilateral aid budget 
Norwegian allocation Poverty-efficient allocation 
Brazil 12.9 Bangladesh 22.5 
Tanzania 6.5 Nigeria 14.7 
Afghanistan 6.3 Ethiopia 8.1 
Sudan 6.1 Tanzania 6.8 
West Bank and Gaza 5.7 Congo, Dem. Rep. 5.0 
Pakistan 4.4 Uganda 4.4 
Mozambique 3.9 Kenya 4.3 
Uganda 3.7 Pakistan 4.1 
Haiti 3.5 Nepal 3.7 
Malawi 3.4 Mozambique 2.9 
 
In the poverty-efficient allocation the top recipients are allocated a very large share of the 
total budget. Bangladesh, Nigeria and Ethiopia are the largest recipients in my poverty-
efficient benchmark allocation. The three combined receive 45.3 percent of the total budget. 
None of these countries are in the list of Norway’s top ten recipients. Ethiopia is the country 
receiving the most of the three, more precisely 1.7 percent of the total Norwegian bilateral aid 
budget. This is much lower than the poverty-efficient 8.1 percent and also considerably lower 
than the shares of the multilateral budget and the DAC budget devoted to this country.  
 
9.8.2 Recipients not present in the poverty-efficient allocation 
I also note that two of the Norwegian top ten recipients are not present in the poverty-efficient 
allocation due to lack of data. These are Afghanistan and the West Bank and Gaza. The per 
capita income of Afghanistan is very low, about $500 a year, which suggests that a large share 
of the population is living below the poverty line. Other countries with similar per capita 
income are Guinea, Rwanda, Togo, Tanzania and Uganda. All of these countries receive large 
amounts of aid in the poverty-efficient allocation. This suggests that if poverty data were 
available, Afghanistan would be among the countries receiving aid in the optimal allocation. 
The West Bank and Gaza lack data on per capita income after 2005. The latest available 
figure is around $1100, which would place it close to Laos, Senegal and Comoros in the 
allocation. It would thereby be in the borderline area of receiving aid or not. Perhaps the 
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inclusion of Afghanistan in the poverty-efficient allocation could have made a difference for 
Norway’s poverty-efficiency, but most likely not. 
  
9.8.3 Large shares to the “wrong” countries 
The most prominent difference between the poverty-efficient allocation and the largest 
Norwegian recipients is Brazil. On top of the Norwegian list, receiving 12.9 percent of the 
bilateral aid budget, is an upper middle income country. In the poverty-efficient allocation this 
country is allocated 0, and is also quite far down the list. This suggests that Brazil would not 
be found eligible for aid receipts even if the estimates from the growth regression were 
significantly different. Disbursing large shares of the aid budget to few countries is likely to 
be good for poverty-efficiency in this model, but they need to be the “right” countries. Brazil 
is definitely not.  
 
9.8.4 Integration of environmental policy, foreign policy and aid 
Some of the explanation for the lower poverty-efficiency of Norwegian aid can probably be 
found in the current integration of environmental policy, foreign policy and aid. Many 
countries that receive considerable portions of the Norwegian budget are not eligible for aid 
receipts in the optimal allocation. Apart from Brazil these include Sudan (6.1 percent of 
bilateral budget), Indonesia (2.2 percent), Sri Lanka (1.5 percent), Guyana (1.5 percent), 
Serbia (1.1 percent) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (1.0 percent). All of these countries are 
either rainforest preservation countries (Indonesia and Guyana) or post-conflict areas, where 
the focus of aid disbursements is on conflict prevention and support to government and civil 
society. The Norwegian government has stated continued and increased priority to 
environment and conflict prevention in their most recent aid budget. The change in recipient 
countries that has occurred during the past decade is therefore somewhat intended. It does 
however appear to have a negative impact on the poverty-efficiency of Norwegian aid. 
Perhaps this is an indication that combining poverty reduction with other priorities is a 
difficult task, and that the government needs to choose its priorities: devoting aid to reduce 
poverty or devoting aid to solve conflict and climate issues.  
Another question is whether funds for rainforest preservation should at all come from the aid 
budget. As briefly mentioned in the introduction there are several aspects of poverty 
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reduction. One is the trade-off between current and future poverty reduction, temporary and 
sustainable poverty reduction. The argument of the Norwegian government that prevention of 
climate change through forest preservation is a way of preventing future rises in poverty is not 
assigned weight within the framework of this model. An increasing portion of the world’s 
poor also live in post-conflict societies. In this way conflict prevention might also be a valid 
and important way of reducing future poverty. If these arguments had been taken into 
consideration, the poverty-efficiency of the current Norwegian aid allocation would probably 
be evaluated as larger. This priority of future over current poverty reduction could be part of 
the reason why Norwegian aid is found not to be very poverty-efficient, and in particular less 
poverty-efficient than the aid of other donors. 
10 Conclusion  
83 
 
10 Conclusion 
The aim of this master thesis has been to make an assessment of the current Norwegian aid 
allocation’s potential for poverty reduction. This has been done using a model developed by 
Collier & Dollar (2002) to construct a so-called poverty-efficient allocation of aid across 
recipient countries. Within the framework of this model poverty reduction occurs as a result 
of economic growth, and this is the only factor donors can affect by their aid allocation. In my 
analysis, firstly the effect of aid on economic growth was estimated by panel regression. I 
found a positive and significant marginal effect of aid on growth in per capita GNI, and the 
effect is subject to diminishing returns. These estimates were then used in construction of the 
poverty-efficient allocation of aid. It should be noted that the regression results are sensitive 
to small changes in specification, especially to the exclusion of outliers. As such, caution 
should be taken using these results as basis for policy recommendations.  
In my poverty-efficient allocation of aid, 32 countries are found eligible for aid receipts. The 
top recipients are allocated just above 30 percent of their own GDP in aid. Compared to actual 
disbursements this is not an unreasonable figure. In the poverty-efficient allocation the 
countries with the highest ratios of poverty to per capita GDP are allocated the largest amount 
of aid when measured in percentage of GDP. A few populous countries receive very large 
amounts in absolute terms. Notably, more than one third of the total aid budget is allocated to 
Bangladesh and Nigeria. Most of the countries that are found eligible for aid receipts in the 
poverty-efficient allocation are least developed countries or other low income countries.  
When comparing the optimal benchmark allocation to the current allocation of aid, large 
discrepancies are apparent. The current allocation of total aid has a rank correlation of 0.63 
with the optimal allocation, and similar estimates are found for DAC donors and multilateral 
agencies. The Norwegian allocation of ODA is correlated at only 0.42 with the optimal 
allocation, thereby being evaluated as substantially less poverty-efficient than the ODA of 
other donors. This is a somewhat surprising result. Twelve years ago Norwegian aid was 
found to be about 50 percent more efficient than average ODA when looking at its potential 
for reducing poverty (Collier & Dollar, 2001b). Returning to the research questions posed in 
the introduction: to what extent is the Norwegian aid allocation in line with the poverty-
efficient allocation of aid? My answer would be: to a surprisingly low extent. There are 
generally two sources of inefficiency in actual allocations compared to the optimal allocation: 
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the number of recipient countries and their character. Norwegian aid unfortunately scores low 
in both categories. 
The difference in the poverty-efficiency of the Norwegian allocation and those of other 
donors, and the fact that it is now turned around, could indicate that average ODA has become 
more efficient at reducing poverty the past decade. It could also suggest that Norwegian aid 
has become less poverty-efficient. Based on the share of Norwegian aid allocated to low 
income countries and the list of top recipients in 2000 and 2010, I am inclined to believe that 
the latter is the case. Significant changes have occurred in the Norwegian aid portfolio the 
past decade. Since 2004 there has been a considerable decline in the share of the total aid 
budget devoted to least developed countries, coinciding with a major increase in 
disbursements to the environment and energy sector. Most of this increase is allocated to 
forest preservation in middle income countries. The most notable example of this 
development is that the upper middle income country Brazil as from 2009 is the largest 
recipient of Norwegian aid.   
The recent integration of Norwegian aid with environmental and foreign policy could be some 
of the reason for the apparent weakening of the poverty-efficiency of Norwegian aid. It is of 
course difficult to establish any causal relationship, but I do note that the two coincide. This 
development has been intended from the side of the Norwegian government. We can only 
assume that the possible trade-offs between poverty reduction and other goals has been taken 
into consideration. It seems like the desire to be a leading player in the field of climate change 
and conflict prevention has had negative implications for the poverty-efficiency of Norwegian 
aid the past decade, at least within the framework of this model. As already mentioned the 
results might have been different if the potential for future poverty reduction had been taken 
into account when assessing aid allocations. 
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11 Appendix 
Appendix A: DAC List of ODA recipient countries by income group 
Least Developed 
Countries 
  
Other Low 
Income countries 
(per capita GNI <= 
$1 005 in 2010) 
Lower Middle 
Income Countries 
and Territories 
(per capita GNI$ 
1 006-$3 975 in 
2010)  
Upper Middle Income 
Countries and 
Territories 
(per capita GNI$3 976-
$12 275 in 2010)  
Afghanistan Kenya Armenia Albania 
Angola Korea, Dem. Rep. Belize Algeria 
Bangladesh Kyrgyz Rep. Bolivia *Anguilla 
Benin South Sudan Cameroon Antigua and Barbuda 
Bhutan Tajikistan Cape Verde Argentina 
Burkina Faso Zimbabwe Congo, Rep. Azerbaijan 
Burundi   Cote d'Ivoire Belarus 
Cambodia   Egypt Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Central African Rep.   El Salvador Botswana 
Chad   Fiji Brazil 
Comoros   Georgia Chile 
Congo, Dem. Rep.    Ghana China 
Djibouti   Guatemala Colombia 
Equatorial Guinea   Guyana Cook Islands 
Eritrea   Honduras Costa Rica 
Ethiopia   India Cuba 
Gambia   Indonesia Dominica 
Guinea   Iraq Dominican Republic 
Guinea-Bissau   Kosovo (1) Ecuador 
Haiti   Marshall Islands FYR Macedonia 
Kiribati   
Micronesia, Federated 
States Gabon 
Laos   Moldova Grenada 
Lesotho   Mongolia Iran 
Liberia   Morocco Jamaica 
Madagascar   Nicaragua Jordan 
Malawi   Nigeria Kazakhstan 
Mali   Pakistan Lebanon 
Mauritania   Papua New Guinea Libya 
Mozambique   Paraguay Malaysia 
Myanmar   Philippines Maldives 
Nepal   Sri Lanka Mauritius 
Niger   Swaziland Mexico 
Rwanda   Syria Montenegro 
Samoa   *Tokelau *Montserrat 
Sao Tomé and Príncipe   Tonga  Namibia 
Senegal   Turkmenistan Nauru 
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Sierra Leone   Ukraine Niue 
Solomon Islands   Uzbekistan Palau 
Somalia   Vietnam Panama 
Sudan    
West Bank and Gaza 
Strip Peru 
Tanzania     Serbia 
Timor-Leste     Seychelles 
Togo     South Africa 
Tuvalu     *St. Helena 
Uganda     St. Kitts-Nevis 
Vanuatu     St. Lucia 
Yemen     St. Vincent and Grenadines 
Zambia     Suriname 
      Thailand 
      Tunisia 
      Turkey 
      Uruguay 
      Venezuela 
      *Wallis and Futuna 
        
        
        
        
        
* Territory       
(1) This is without prejudice to the status of Kosovo under international law. 
 
 
Appendix B: Deriving the first order conditions of the maximization problem.  
 
We have the following maximization problem:  
Max poverty reduction  
i
iiii NhG   (2.1) 
Subject to  
 
 
i
iii ANyA ,
 
0iA
 
From here we construct the Lagrangian function:  
 ANyANhGL iiiiiii    
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Growth is assumed to be a function of aid and policy. The derivative of the Lagrangian with 
respect to A
i
 is then:   
iiiiii
ai
NyNhG
A
L
 


 
The first order condition for a maximum is fulfilled when setting this expression equal to 
zero, so we get: 
iiiiii
a
iiiiii
a NyNhGNyNhG   0  
In this equation iaG represents the derivative of growth with respect to aid. Since both sides of 
the equation are multiplied with 
iN , we can eliminate this from the equation, and we are then 
left with the expression in equation (2.2). 
iiii
a yhG    
 
The modified version of the maximization problem, used for my calculations: 
Max poverty reduction  
i
iiii NhG   (2.1) 
Subject to  
 
 
i
iii
A
NyA
100
,
 
0iA
 
From here we construct the Lagrangian function:  






 A
NyA
NhGL
iii
iiii
100
  
The derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to A
i
 is then:   
100
ii
iiii
ai
Ny
NhG
A
L 
 


 
When setting this expression equal to zero, we get: 
100
0
100
ii
iiii
a
ii
iiii
a
Ny
NhG
Ny
NhG



   
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ii
i
i
a
i
iii
a
h
y
G
y
hG



100100
  
From here we can insert for the marginal effect of aid on growth, in my case A43 2   
ii
i
i
ii
i
h
y
A
h
y
A







10022100
2
44
3
43   
 
Appendix C: Principal component analysis for constructing the policy variable 
With principal component analysis (PCA) in theory we start out with a covariance matrix 
including the variance of each variable and the covariance between them, which in my case 
would be a 3x3 matrix. Stata takes care of the whole construction of the new variable, and 
will generate as many principal components as the number of variables included. When 
receiving the PCA command the software directly generates the eigenvalues and 
eigenvectors
37
 for the variables included. These are shown in the table below: 
pca infldum govdum tradedum 
  
     Principal components/correlation              Number of obs = 1134 
Number of comp.  =   3 
    Trace            =  3 
Rotation: (unrotated = principal)               Rho  =  1.0000 
     Component     Eigenvalue    Difference   Proportion    Cumulative 
     Comp1       1.3284 0.439245 0.4428 0.4428 
Comp2         0.88915 0.106696 0.2964 0.7392 
Comp3    0.782454    .              0.2608 1 
     Principal components (eigenvectors)  
  
     Variable      Comp1      Comp2      Comp3   Unexplained  
infldum    0.5581 -0.6671 0.4934 0 
govdum    0.5389 0.7436 0.3958 0 
tradedum     0.6309 -0.0450 -0.7745 0 
                                                 
37
 Definition from Verbeek (2012, p.445): “Let A be a symmetric n x n matrix. Consider the following problem 
of finding combinations of a vector c (other than the null vector) and a scalar λ that satisfy Ac= λc. In general 
there are n solutions λ1,…, λn called the eigenvalues (characteristic roots) of A, corresponding to n vectors c1,…,cn 
called the eigenvectors (characteristic vectors)”. 
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From here we can use the predict command which gives us three new variables that are linear 
combinations of the original variables included. The constructed variables are now ready to be 
used in regressions. The variable with the highest eigenvalue is the one that captures the most 
of the variation in the dataset, and is called the first principal component (Smith, 2002). The 
next two are calculated on the basis of capturing as much as possible of the variation in the 
data while not being correlated to the first (or second) principal component, and will therefore 
have lower eigenvalues than the first principal component. There are a number of ways to 
decide which and how many of the principal components to keep. The most widely used is the 
Kaiser criterion, which states that we should retain only the factors with an eigenvalue larger 
than one (StatSoft, 2012). This would leave me with one principal component to be used as a 
policy variable in my analysis. 
 
Appendix D: Descriptive statistics 
Variables included in the regression and the poverty-efficient allocation of aid 
Variable Description of variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source 
        GNI per capita growth Growth rate of per 429 2.05 3.89 -12.89 35.72 WDI 
 
capita GNI, averaged  
      
 
over four years  
      
        Initial GNI Per capita GNI for 429 2191 2946 78.52 19793 WDI 
 
 the first year of 
      
 
each four year period 
      
        Log Initial GNI Log of initial GNI 429 7.04 1.15 4.36 9.89 WDI 
        Policy Value constructed by  429 -0.26 1.19 -4.58 0.69 WDI 
 
PCA, includes dummy 
      
 
variables for trade,   
      
 
government consumption 
      
 
 and Inflation rate 
      
        ODA/GDP percent ODA (net disbursements)  429 4.92 7.86 -0.12 85.84 OECD.Stat/WDI 
 
% of recipient country GDP  
      
        (ODA/GDP percent)^2 Squared value of  429 97.10 503.81 0.00 8972.61 OECD.Stat/WDI 
 
ODA/GDP percent 
      
        Institutional Quality  International Country Risk  429 0.46 0.15 0.06 0.89 QoG Standard dataset 
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(ICRG)  Guide measure of 
      
 
 Quality of Governance 
      
        Policy x ODA/GDP  Interaction term between  429 -1.88 9.02 -72.38 85.73 WDI 
percent Policy and ODA/GDP percent 
      
        ICRG x ODA/GDP  Interaction term between 429 2.03 3.17 -0.09 25.93 QoG Standard dataset 
percent  ICRG and ODA/GDP percent 
      
        CDaid ODA (net disbursements) divided  429 0.52 1.09 -0.05 15.34 OECD.Stat/PWT 7.1 
 
by real PPP per capita GDP 
      
        (CDaid)^2 Squared value of CDaid  429 1.78 17.54 0.00 354.67 OECD.Stat/PWT 7.1 
        Policy x CDaid Interaction term between  429 -0.42 1.34 -18.29 1.41 WDI 
 
Policy and CDaid 
      
        ICRG x CDaid Interaction term between 429 0.20 0.34 -0.02 2.24 QoG Standard dataset 
 
 ICRG and CDaid 
      
        Indicators used in  
Policy variable 
       
        Trade Trade, % of GDP 429 70.79 42.75 13.14 334.04 WDI 
        Government  Government consumption, 429 13.37 4.66 3.92 27.76 WDI 
Consumption % of GDP  
      
        Inflation rate Percentage annual  429 61.47 387.25 -3.24 6251.50 WDI 
 
change in CPI 
       
Poverty data 
 
Obs Mean    St.dev Min Max Source 
        Headcount poverty  
$1.25/day (%) 
Percentage of 
population 112 22.1 23.2 0.0 86.2 PovcalNet 
 
living below the $1.25  
      
 
poverty line 
      
        Poverty gap  Mean shortfall of the  112 8.4 10.9 0.0 50.5 PovcalNet 
$1.25/day (%) poverty line, % of  
      
 
poverty line 
      
        Squared poverty gap  Mean shortfall of the  112 4.5 6.6 0.0 33.9 PovcalNet 
$1.25/day poverty line, % of  
      
 
poverty line, squaring 
      
 
every observation 
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before calculating  
      
 
the mean 
      
Headcount poverty 
 
Percentage of 
population 114 36.8 29.9 0.1 94.7 PovcalNet 
$2/day (%) living below the $2 
      
 
poverty line 
      
        Poverty gap  Mean shortfall of the  114 16.3 16.5 0.0 65.8 PovcalNet 
$2/day (%) poverty line, % of  
      
 
poverty line 
      
        Squared poverty gap  Mean shortfall of the  114 9.4 11.0 0.0 49.5 PovcalNet 
$2/day poverty line, % of  
      
 
poverty line, squaring 
      
 
every observation 
      
 
before calculating  
      
 
the mean 
      
        GDP per capita Gross domestic  111 3578.4 3488.5 198.7 15613.7 WDI 
 
product divided by 
      
 
midyear population 
      
 
Current US$ 
       
Time dummies 
        
  Time dummy Years included   
  Period1 1974-1977   
  Period2 1978-1981   
  Period3 1982-1985   
  Period4 1986-1989   
  Period5 1990-1993   
  Period6 1994-1997   
  Period7 1998-2001   
  Period8 2002-2005   
  Period9 2006-2009   
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Regional Dummies 
 
 
    
Eastern 
Europe & 
post Soviet 
Union 
Latin America North Africa &  
the Middle East 
Sub-Saharan  
Africa 
Western Europe & 
North America 
 
Albania Argentina Cyprus Burkina Faso Malta 
Armenia Bolivia  Algeria Botswana 
 Azerbaijan Brazil Egypt Cote d'Ivoire 
 Belarus Colombia Iran Comoros 
 Croatia Costa Rica Jordan  Ethiopia 
 Kazakhstan Dominican Rep. Lebanon Gabon 
 Moldova Ecuador Morocco Guinea 
 Serbia Guatemala Oman Gambia 
 Slovenia Honduras Saudi Arabia Kenya 
 Ukraine Mexico Syria Liberia 
 
 
Nicaragua Tunisia  Madagascar 
 
 
Panama Turkey Mali 
 
 
Peru Yemen Mozambique 
 
 
Paraguay 
 
Namibia 
 
 
El Salvador 
 
Sudan 
 
 
Uruguay 
 
Senegal 
 
 
Venezuela 
 
Togo 
 
   
Tanzania 
 
   
Uganda 
 
   
South Africa  
 
   
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 
 
   
Zambia 
 
   
Zimbabwe 
 
     
               East Asia South-East Asia South Asia The Pacific The Caribbean 
China Brunei Bangladesh Papua New  Bahamas 
Korea, Rep. Indonesia India Guinea Trinidad and Tobago  
 
Malaysia Sri Lanka 
  
 
Philippines  Pakistan 
  
 
Singapore 
   
 
Thailand 
   
 
Vietnam 
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Appendix E: Assumptions for OLS, FE and RE estimation models 
 
Gauss-Markov assumptions for OLS estimation 
Assumption OLS.1: Linear in parameters 
The model in the population can be written as uxxy kk   ...110 , where 
k ,...,, 10 are the unknown parameters (constants) of interest and u is an unobservable 
random error or disturbance term. 
Assumption OLS.2: Random sampling 
We have a random sample of n observations,   niyxxx iiii ,....,1:,,...,, 321   following the 
population model in Assumption MLR.1. 
Assumption OLS.3: No perfect collinearity 
In the sample (and therefore in the population), none of the independent variables is constant, 
and there are no exact linear relationship among the independent variables. 
Assumption OLS.4: Zero conditional mean 
The error u has an expected value of zero given any values of the explanatory variables. In 
other words, E(u|x1, x2, …, xk)=0. 
Under the first four assumptions the OLS estimator is unbiased, which means that its expected 
value is equal to the true population value of the parameter (Wooldridge, 2009, p. 847)  
Assumption OLS.5: Homoskedasticity 
The error u has the same variance given any values of the explanatory variables. In other 
words, 
  221 ,....,,| kxxxuVar . 
Assumption OLS.6: Normality  
The population error u is independent of the explanatory variables x1, x2,…, xk and is 
normally distributed with zero mean and variance  22 ,0~:  Normalu . 
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Adding assumption OLS.5 the OLS estimator is also efficient or BLUE. Assumption OLS.6 is 
added to obtain the exact sampling distributions of t-statistics and F-statistics, so that exact 
hypothesis testing can be carried out. 
 
Assumptions for fixed and random effects estimation 
Assumption FE.1:  
For each i, the model is ,...11 itiitkkitit uxxy    ,,....,1 Tt  where the j  are the 
parameters to estimate and  is the unobserved effect.  
Assumption FE.2: 
We have a random sample from the cross section 
Assumption FE.3: 
Each explanatory variable changes over time (for at least some i), and no perfect collinear 
relationships exist among the explanatory variables. 
Assumption FE.4: 
For each t, the expected value of the idiosyncratic error given the explanatory variables in all 
time periods and the unobserved effect is zero:   0,| iiit XuE  . 
Under these four assumptions the fixed effects estimator is unbiased. The key assumption 
here is FE.4, which requires so-called strict exogeneity. The idiosyncratic (time-varying) error 
term, uit, should be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables not just in the same time 
period as the assumption is for OLS estimation, but in all periods. This is a rather strong 
assumption.   
Assumption FE.5: 
    ,,| 2uitiiit uVarXuVar    for all Tt ,....,1  
Assumption FE.6 
For all st  , the idiosyncratic errors are uncorrelated (conditional on all explanatory 
variables and i ):   0,|, iiisit XuuCov   
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When all of the six FE conditions are satisfied the fixed effects estimator is the best linear 
unbiased estimator (BLUE). Adding another, seventh, assumption to the set, the FE estimator 
is normally distributed, and the t and F statistics have the exact t and F distributions. 
Assumption FE.7 
Conditional on Xi and i , the uit are independent and identically distributed as Normal
 2,0 u  
For the random effects estimator some of the assumptions are the same; that is FE.1, FE.2, 
FE.4, FE.5 and FE.6. Since the random effects estimator allows for variables that are constant 
over time, FE.3 is replaced with  
Assumption RE.3 
There are no perfect linear relationships among the explanatory variables. 
Assumption RE.4 
In addition to FE.4 the expected value of i given all explanatory variables is constant:  
  0,|  ii XE  
This is the key distinction between the fixed and random effects estimators, as RE does not 
allow for correlation between the unobserved effect and the explanatory variables. 
Assumption RE.5 
In addition to FE.5, the variance of i given all explanatory variables is constant: 
  2|  ii XVar  
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Appendix F: Countries and time periods included in the regressions 
Code Country  1982- 
1985 
1986- 
1989 
1990- 
1993 
1994- 
1997 
1998- 
2001 
2002- 
2005 
2006- 
2009 
Number of 
obs 
ALB Albania - - - 1 1 1 1 4 
ARG Argentina - 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
ARM Armenia - - - - 1 1 1 3 
AZE Azerbaijan - - - - 1 1 1 3 
BFA Burkina Faso 1 1 1 1 1 1 - 6 
BGD Bangladesh - 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
BHS Bahamas - - 1 1 - - - 2 
BLR Belarus - - - - - 1 1 2 
BOL Bolivia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
BRA Brazil 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
BRN Brunei - - 1 1 - - - 2 
BWA Botswana 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
CHN China - 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
CIV Cote d' Ivoire 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
CMR Comoros 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
COL Colombia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
CRI Costa Rica 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
CYP Cyprus 1 1 1 1 - - - 4 
DOM Dominican 
Republic 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
DZA Algeria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
ECU Ecuador 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
EGY Egypt 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
ETH Ethiopia - - 1 1 1 1 1 5 
GAB Gabon 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
GIN Guinea - - - - - 1 1 2 
GMB Gambia - 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
GTM Guatemala 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
HND Honduras 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
HRV Croatia - - - - 1 1 1 3 
IDN Indonesia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
IND India 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
IRN Iran 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
JOR Jordan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
KAZ Kazakhstan - - - - 1 1 1 3 
KEN Kenya 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
KOR Korea, Republic 1 1 1 1 1 - - 5 
LBN Lebanon - - - - - - 1 1 
LBR Liberia - - - - - 1 1 2 
LKA Sri Lanka - 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
MAR Morocco 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
MDA Macedonia - - - - 1 1 1 3 
MDG Madagascar 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
MEX Mexico 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
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MLI Mali - - 1 1 1 1 1 5 
MLT Malta - 1 1 1 1 1 - 5 
MOZ Mozambique - 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
MYS Malaysia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
NAM Namibia - - - - - 1 1 2 
NIC Nicaragua - - - - 1 1 1 3 
OMN Oman - - - - 1 1 - 2 
PAK Pakistan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
PAN Panama 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
PER Peru 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
PHL Philippines 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
PNG Papua New 
Guinea 
1 1 1 1 1 1 - 6 
PRY Paraguay 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
SAU Saudi Arabia - - - - 1 1 1 3 
SDN Sudan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
SEN Senegal 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
SGP Singapore 1 1 1 1 - - - 4 
SLV El Salvador 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
SRB Serbia - - - - - - 1 1 
SVN Slovenia - - - - 1 1 - 2 
SYR Syria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
TGO Togo 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
THA Thailand 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
TTO Trinidad and 
Tobago 
1 1 1 1 1 1 - 6 
TUN Tunisia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
TUR Turkey - - 1 1 1 1 1 5 
TZA Tanzania - - 1 1 1 1 1 5 
UGA Uganda 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
UKR Ukraine - - - - - 1 1 2 
URY Uruguay 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
VEN Venezuela - - - - - - 1 1 
VNM Vietnam - - - 1 1 1 1 4 
YEM Yemen - - 1 1 1 1 1 5 
ZAF South Africa - - 1 1 1 1 1 5 
ZAR Congo,  
Dem. Rep 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
ZMB Zambia - 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
ZWE Zimbabwe 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Total 
 
45 53 61 63 66 72 69 431 
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Appendix G: Statistical tests  
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation 
Using the Stata command xtserial and including all the variables that are in the regressions we 
can test for autocorrelation in the data. The results are posted below. Here we reject the null 
hypothesis of zero autocorrelation in the error terms for both aid variables. This will not have 
consequences for the unbiasedness of the estimators, but can cause inference problems 
because the standard deviations will not be correct, and thus hypothesis testing might give 
incorrect conclusions. 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
F(  1,      67) =   4.517 
Prob > F =  0.0373 
 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for the suitability of OLS 
The Stata command xttest0 when used after running a random effects model performs a 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test on the estimates. This test detects the 
possibility of heteroskedasticity in the errors, and thereby the inefficiency of the OLS 
estimator.  
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
            gnipc_growth[id,t] = Xb + u[id] + e[id,t] 
 
            Estimated results: 
     Var  sd = sqrt(Var) 
                GNI per capita growth    15.04948 3.879367 
                        e  6.71642 2.591606 
                        u     2.195074 1.481578 
 
            Test:   Var(u) = 0 
                                chibar2(01) =    10.28 
                             Prob > chibar2 =   0.0007 
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Hausman test for fixed versus random effects 
The Hausman test for fixed versus random effects entails running the same specification with 
the two different estimators, storing the estimates and then running a Hausman test for 
detecting difference between the estimates. A rejection of H0 indicates that RE will give 
biased estimators, and this is the conclusion reached performing the test on my data. 
hausman fixed random 
     
      
 
---- Coefficients ---- 
   
 
(b)           (B)             (b-B)      sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
 
fixed         random        Difference           S.E. 
 
      lninitial GNI -3.16607 -0.67513 -2.49094 0.713735 
 Policy 0.562694 0.217293 0.345401 0.056455 
 ODA/GDP percent 0.313332 0.407486 -0.09415 0.012867 
 (ODA/GDP percent)^2 -0.00442 -0.00189 -0.00254 0.000275 
 PolicyxODA/GDP percent -0.02311 0.008831 -0.03194 0.003657 
 ICRG 5.69829 6.37867 -0.68038 0.296339 
 ICRGxODA/GDP percent -0.34294 -0.6423 0.299362 . 
 period4 1.27228 1.299042 -0.02676              . 
 period5 1.484898 1.271604 0.213294           . 
 period6 2.454599 2.312594 0.142005               . 
 period7 1.491421 1.222339 0.269082            . 
 period8 3.503918 3.360616 0.143303               . 
 period9 3.834669 3.224967 0.609702 0.114886 
 
      
      b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
chi2(13)  = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
 
  
= 112.78 
   
 
Prob>chi2   = 0.0000 
  
  
(V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
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Appendix H: Regression results  
Regression results from OLS and RE regression for the ODA/GDP percent variable 
 
OLS Regression results, calculated with cluster robust standard errors. Dependent variable: 
Growth in per capita GNI. Aid variable: ODA as percentage of GDP 
 OLS1 OLS2 OLS3 OLS4 
Log Initial GNI 0.591** -0.302 -0.287 -0.384 
 (0.247) (0.313) (0.330) (0.302) 
ODA/GDP percent 0.186** 0.074 0.087 0.326 
 (0.080) (0.096) (0.116) (0.276) 
(ODA/GDP percent)^2 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Eastern Europe -0.541 2.390** 2.352** 2.638** 
 (0.956) (1.137) (1.145) (1.151) 
Latin America -2.512*** -0.941* -1.047* -0.662 
 (0.357) (0.565) (0.617) (0.533) 
North Africa and Middle East -2.164*** -0.895* -0.936* -0.685 
 (0.401) (0.523) (0.528) (0.499) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -3.510*** -2.604*** -2.654*** -2.417*** 
 (0.637) (0.840) (0.852) (0.833) 
East Asia 4.137*** 4.983*** 4.982*** 4.945*** 
 (1.361) (0.677) (0.668) (0.677) 
South-East Asia 0.093 0.633 0.611 0.695 
 (0.629) (0.789) (0.780) (0.750) 
South Asia 0.051 0.374 0.313 0.455 
 (0.733) (0.889) (0.879) (0.860) 
Pacific -5.160*** -3.725*** -3.882*** -3.249*** 
 (0.560) (0.584) (0.718) (0.618) 
Caribbean -2.620*** -1.452*** -1.441*** -1.281** 
 (0.392) (0.524) (0.530) (0.544) 
Period 4 -0.644 1.282** 1.306** 1.282** 
 (0.467) (0.613) (0.616) (0.609) 
Period 5 -1.488** 1.274* 1.293* 1.191* 
 (0.643) (0.694) (0.692) (0.680) 
Period 6 0.365 2.320*** 2.353*** 2.211*** 
 (0.599) (0.653) (0.659) (0.661) 
Period 7 -0.142 1.269** 1.300** 1.155** 
 (0.320) (0.537) (0.548) (0.526) 
Period 8 1.647*** 3.582*** 3.621*** 3.447*** 
 (0.495) (0.727) (0.766) (0.685) 
Period 9 1.511*** 3.257*** 3.289*** 3.212*** 
 (0.396) (0.581) (0.589) (0.601) 
Policy  0.150 0.067 0.113 
  (0.157) (0.224) (0.201) 
Institutional quality (ICRG)  3.902** 3.921** 6.568*** 
  (1.716) (1.696) (1.952) 
Policy x ODA/GDP percent   0.018 0.006 
   (0.029) (0.027) 
ICRG x ODA/GDP percent    -0.543 
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    (0.475) 
R
2
 0.161 0.312 0.313 0.327 
Observations 780 431 431 431 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
Random effects regression results, calculated with robust standard errors. Dependent 
variable: Growth in per capita GNI. Aid variable: ODA as percentage of GDP. 
 RE1 RE2 RE3 RE4 
Log Initial GNI 0.517** -0.555* -0.543 -0.682** 
 (0.234) (0.333) (0.345) (0.301) 
ODA/GDP percent 0.225*** 0.123 0.138 0.404 
 (0.083) (0.135) (0.147) (0.284) 
(ODA/GDP percent)^2 -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Eastern Europe -0.721 1.715 1.664 1.984 
 (2.391) (2.248) (2.280) (2.375) 
Latin America -2.583 -1.232 -1.362 -0.935 
 (2.166) (2.070) (2.116) (2.211) 
North Africa and Middle East -2.304 -1.279 -1.328 -1.057 
 (2.175) (2.072) (2.103) (2.215) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -3.900* -3.152 -3.216 -2.938 
 (2.246) (2.121) (2.152) (2.261) 
East Asia 4.005* 4.645** 4.640** 4.543* 
 (2.298) (2.237) (2.268) (2.395) 
South-East Asia -0.057 0.272 0.239 0.246 
 (2.208) (2.131) (2.156) (2.261) 
South Asia -0.121 -0.293 -0.370 -0.281 
 (2.243) (2.143) (2.174) (2.281) 
Pacific -5.624** -4.732 -4.921 -4.145 
 (2.683) (2.959) (3.017) (3.137) 
Caribbean -2.821 -1.686 -1.678 -1.514 
 (2.311) (2.968) (2.994) (3.071) 
Period 4 -0.731 1.314** 1.339** 1.303** 
 (0.507) (0.593) (0.594) (0.603) 
Period 5 -1.541** 1.358** 1.383** 1.276** 
 (0.622) (0.624) (0.624) (0.639) 
Period 6 0.321 2.421*** 2.462*** 2.304*** 
 (0.579) (0.534) (0.546) (0.547) 
Period 7 -0.153 1.360** 1.399** 1.206** 
 (0.365) (0.541) (0.555) (0.540) 
Period 8 1.602*** 3.511*** 3.560*** 3.336*** 
 (0.486) (0.670) (0.701) (0.623) 
Period 9 1.505*** 3.280*** 3.322*** 3.197*** 
 (0.397) (0.549) (0.562) (0.568) 
Policy  0.306* 0.213 0.254 
  (0.169) (0.231) (0.218) 
Institutional quality (ICRG)  3.326** 3.343** 6.337*** 
  (1.661) (1.650) (2.029) 
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Policy x ODA/GDP percent   0.021 0.007 
   (0.026) (0.023) 
ICRG x ODA/GDP percent    -0.639 
    (0.407) 
R
2
     
Observations 780 431 431 431 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Results from FE regression excluding observations at the country level 
Results from fixed effects regression, calculated with robust standard errors. Dependent 
variable: Growth in per capita GNI. Aid variable: ODA as percentage of GDP. 
 66 
countries 
Group 
7&8 
included 
Group 2 
included 
Group 
3&5 
included 
Group 4 
included 
Full 
sample 
Log Initial GNI -
2.831*** 
-2.823** -2.842** -2.880** -
3.166*** 
-
3.166*** 
 (1.023) (1.126) (1.124) (1.103) (1.123) (1.109) 
Policy 0.472* 0.457* 0.454* 0.526* 0.570** 0.563** 
 (0.238) (0.261) (0.263) (0.269) (0.271) (0.269) 
ODA/GDP percent 0.266** 0.273* 0.303** 0.298** 0.256* 0.313** 
 (0.126) (0.139) (0.138) (0.133) (0.139) (0.135) 
(ODA/GDP percent)^2 -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* -
0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Policy x ODA/GDP 
percent 
-0.015 -0.014 -0.018 -0.021 -0.019 -0.023 
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) 
Institutional quality 
(ICRG) 
6.553*** 6.664*** 6.620*** 6.659*** 5.701*** 5.698*** 
 (1.784) (1.963) (1.947) (1.874) (1.916) (2.048) 
ICRG x ODA/GDP 
percent 
-0.391** -0.399** -0.410** -0.409** -0.352* -0.343 
 (0.159) (0.175) (0.170) (0.168) (0.182) (0.240) 
Period 4 1.385** 1.386** 1.365** 1.072 1.138* 1.272* 
 (0.612) (0.661) (0.661) (0.678) (0.663) (0.674) 
Period 5 1.426* 1.395 1.371 1.427* 1.419* 1.485* 
 (0.772) (0.836) (0.838) (0.807) (0.800) (0.804) 
Period 6 2.391*** 2.447*** 2.443*** 2.293*** 2.262*** 2.455*** 
 (0.694) (0.751) (0.748) (0.746) (0.744) (0.767) 
Period 7 1.274** 1.287* 1.401* 1.320* 1.329* 1.491** 
 (0.635) (0.695) (0.703) (0.698) (0.702) (0.715) 
Period 8 3.515*** 3.534*** 3.527*** 3.394*** 3.301*** 3.504*** 
 (0.748) (0.823) (0.829) (0.814) (0.819) (0.809) 
Period 9 3.744*** 3.764*** 3.737*** 3.656*** 3.665*** 3.835*** 
 (0.816) (0.901) (0.912) (0.892) (0.896) (0.914) 
R
2
 0.247 0.250 0.245 0.247 0.233 0.308 
Observations 381 387 395 413 422 431 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Results from FE regressions excluding outliers 
Fixed effects regression results, excluding outliers, calculated with robust standard errors. 
Dependent variable: Growth in per capita GNI. Aid variable: ODA as percentage of GDP. 
 Excluding 
ODA/GDP 
outliers 
Excluding 
growth 
outliers 
Excluding all 
outliers 
Log Initial GNI -2.995** -3.646*** -3.364*** 
 (1.139) (1.121) (1.132) 
Policy 0.534** 0.538** 0.513* 
 (0.258) (0.260) (0.258) 
ODA/GDP percent 0.122 0.206 0.151 
 (0.181) (0.156) (0.176) 
(ODA/GDP percent)^2 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Policy x ODA/GDP percent -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 
 (0.033) (0.030) (0.034) 
Institutional quality (ICRG) 4.053* 5.572*** 4.350** 
 (2.061) (1.883) (1.999) 
ICRG x ODA/GDP percent -0.009 -0.291 -0.021 
 (0.259) (0.199) (0.254) 
Period 4 1.354* 1.305* 1.336* 
 (0.683) (0.673) (0.682) 
Period 5 1.605** 1.538* 1.597* 
 (0.800) (0.791) (0.803) 
Period 6 2.531*** 2.468*** 2.541*** 
 (0.745) (0.756) (0.749) 
Period 7 1.516** 1.578** 1.633** 
 (0.687) (0.701) (0.683) 
Period 8 3.402*** 3.555*** 3.558*** 
 (0.799) (0.813) (0.801) 
Period 9 3.811*** 3.816*** 3.830*** 
 (0.854) (0.914) (0.879) 
R
2
 0.219 0.251 0.232 
Observations 426 429 424 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Regression results using the CDaid variable 
 
Regression results, different estimation models, calculated with robust standard errors. 
Dependent variable: Growth in per capita GNI. Aid variable: CDaid. 
 OLS4 RE4 FE4 
Log Initial GNI -0.391 -1.054** -3.299** 
 (0.288) (0.411) (1.288) 
Policy 0.152 0.303* 0.432** 
 (0.163) (0.183) (0.208) 
CDaid -0.078 -0.102 -0.452 
 (0.360) (0.443) (0.843) 
(CDaid)^2 0.006 0.021 0.034 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.028) 
Policy x CDaid 0.122 0.232 0.238* 
 (0.145) (0.144) (0.140) 
Institutional quality (ICRG) 3.166* 3.097* 3.572** 
 (1.831) (1.749) (1.762) 
ICRG x CDaid 1.198 0.249 -0.201 
 (0.958) (1.001) (1.487) 
Eastern Europe 2.336* 1.189 . 
 (1.211) (2.860) . 
Latin America -1.070 -1.602 . 
 (0.649) (2.649) . 
North Africa and Middle East -1.074* -1.660 . 
 (0.578) (2.664) . 
Sub-Saharan Africa -2.477*** -3.339 . 
 (0.851) (2.695) . 
East Asia 4.407*** 3.958 . 
 (0.376) (2.839) . 
South-East Asia 0.361 -0.315 . 
 (0.798) (2.703) . 
South Asia -0.096 -1.029 . 
 (0.842) (2.740) . 
Pacific -3.563*** -5.133 . 
 (0.703) (3.965) . 
Caribbean -1.544*** -1.788 . 
 (0.508) (3.888) . 
Period 4 1.427** 1.432** 1.386** 
 (0.605) (0.582) (0.673) 
Period 5 1.463** 1.566*** 1.650** 
 (0.658) (0.589) (0.761) 
Period 6 2.463*** 2.498*** 2.527*** 
 (0.663) (0.523) (0.695) 
Period 7 1.330** 1.342*** 1.488** 
 (0.542) (0.519) (0.634) 
Period 8 3.648*** 3.365*** 3.500*** 
 (0.758) (0.600) (0.738) 
Period 9 3.328*** 3.136*** 3.583*** 
 (0.584) (0.525) (0.854) 
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R
2
 0.296  0.206 
Observations 431 431 431 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
Fixed effects regression results, calculated with robust standard errors. Dependent 
variable: Growth in per capita GNI. Aid variable: CDaid. 
 FE1 FE2 FE3 FE4 
Log Initial GNI -2.825* -3.258** -3.284** -3.299** 
 (1.585) (1.296) (1.298) (1.288) 
CDaid -0.135 -0.580 -0.510 -0.452 
 (0.685) (0.805) (0.703) (0.843) 
(CDaid)^2 0.020 0.032 0.035 0.034 
 (0.028) (0.030) (0.025) (0.028) 
Period 4 -0.866 1.353** 1.388** 1.386** 
 (0.524) (0.664) (0.671) (0.673) 
Period 5 -1.309** 1.625** 1.653** 1.650** 
 (0.655) (0.758) (0.758) (0.761) 
Period 6 0.328 2.477*** 2.534*** 2.527*** 
 (0.622) (0.681) (0.684) (0.695) 
Period 7 -0.127 1.448** 1.496** 1.488** 
 (0.324) (0.613) (0.621) (0.634) 
Period 8 1.628*** 3.487*** 3.504*** 3.500*** 
 (0.436) (0.732) (0.736) (0.738) 
Period 9 1.840*** 3.584*** 3.587*** 3.583*** 
 (0.456) (0.832) (0.844) (0.854) 
Policy  0.551*** 0.432** 0.432** 
  (0.203) (0.208) (0.208) 
Institutional quality (ICRG)  3.649** 3.454** 3.572** 
  (1.738) (1.686) (1.762) 
Policy x CDaid   0.239* 0.238* 
   (0.142) (0.140) 
ICRG x CDaid    -0.201 
    (1.487) 
R
2
 0.077 0.202 0.206 0.206 
Observations 781 431 431 431 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Fixed effects regression results, excluding outliers, calculated with robust standard errors. 
Dependent variable: Growth in per capita GNI. Aid variable: CDaid. 
 Excluding 
ODA/GDP 
outliers 
Excluding 
growth 
outliers 
Excluding all 
outliers 
Log Initial GNI -3.674** -3.869*** -4.549*** 
 (1.410) (1.263) (1.187) 
Policy 0.558* 0.419* 0.377* 
 (0.288) (0.211) (0.225) 
CDaid 2.468 -0.226 2.016 
 (3.797) (0.532) (3.957) 
(CDaid)^2 -3.387 0.023 -0.990 
 (2.903) (0.018) (2.040) 
Policy x CDaid -0.158 0.299** 0.348 
 (0.601) (0.134) (0.431) 
Institutional quality (ICRG) 2.284 3.992** 3.990** 
 (2.363) (1.630) (1.832) 
ICRG x CDaid 3.316 -0.157 -0.941 
 (5.770) (1.346) (3.480) 
Period 4 1.234 1.382** 1.231 
 (0.753) (0.673) (0.750) 
Period 5 1.966** 1.651** 1.914** 
 (0.815) (0.765) (0.820) 
Period 6 2.667*** 2.540*** 2.652*** 
 (0.781) (0.705) (0.746) 
Period 7 1.423* 1.631** 1.681** 
 (0.743) (0.646) (0.696) 
Period 8 3.497*** 3.497*** 3.623*** 
 (0.835) (0.751) (0.800) 
Period 9 3.684*** 3.840*** 4.035*** 
 (0.959) (0.848) (0.861) 
R
2
 0.199 0.251 0.230 
Observations 399 429 397 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Results from fixed effects regression, calculated with robust standard errors. Dependent 
variable: Growth in per capita GNI. Aid variable: CDaid. 
 66 
countries 
Group 
7&8 
included 
Group 2 
included 
Group 
3&5 
included 
Group 4 
included 
Full 
sample 
Log Initial GNI -2.910** -2.922** -2.996** -3.061** -3.344** -3.299** 
 (1.362) (1.337) (1.334) (1.303) (1.317) (1.288) 
Policy 0.338 0.327 0.319 0.394* 0.433* . 
 (0.213) (0.210) (0.209) (0.218) (0.222) . 
CDaid 0.082 0.115 0.111 0.082 -0.098 -0.452 
 (0.512) (0.497) (0.494) (0.497) (0.547) (0.843) 
(CDaid)^2 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.020 0.034 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.028) 
Policy x CDaid 0.239** 0.240** 0.253** 0.218* 0.230* 0.238* 
 (0.117) (0.117) (0.118) (0.122) (0.123) (0.140) 
Institutional quality 
(ICRG) 
4.465** 4.596** 4.433** 4.600*** 3.843** 3.572** 
 (1.773) (1.758) (1.753) (1.685) (1.717) (1.762) 
ICRG x CDaid -0.323 -0.380 -0.346 -0.403 -0.174 -0.201 
 (1.350) (1.346) (1.348) (1.365) (1.391) (1.487) 
Period 4 1.526** 1.523** 1.525** 1.213* 1.260* 1.386** 
 (0.684) (0.668) (0.670) (0.692) (0.674) (0.673) 
Period 5 1.594* 1.550* 1.558* 1.604** 1.584** 1.650** 
 (0.835) (0.822) (0.824) (0.793) (0.783) (0.761) 
Period 6 2.565*** 2.614*** 2.625*** 2.467*** 2.425*** 2.527*** 
 (0.727) (0.715) (0.714) (0.713) (0.709) (0.695) 
Period 7 1.429** 1.433** 1.551** 1.465** 1.466** 1.488** 
 (0.657) (0.653) (0.663) (0.654) (0.656) (0.634) 
Period 8 3.528*** 3.541*** 3.534*** 3.410*** 3.313*** 3.500*** 
 (0.772) (0.770) (0.774) (0.751) (0.758) (0.738) 
Period 9 3.815*** 3.828*** 3.795*** 3.730*** 3.745*** 3.583*** 
 (0.854) (0.856) (0.862) (0.831) (0.835) (0.854) 
R
2
 0.240 0.243 0.236 0.237 0.228 0.206 
Observations 379 385 393 413 422 431 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Appendix I: The poverty-efficient allocation of ODA in 2010 
Country Benchmark allocation, $2 hc Poverty-efficient allocation, % of recipient GDP 
  % of GDP $ million $2 pov.gap $1.25 hc $1.25 pov.gap 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 34.41 4511.03 30.61 35.70 34.30 
Burundi 33.34 675.72 31.25 34.71 34.46 
Liberia 33.30 328.96 30.60 34.74 34.13 
Malawi 30.54 1543.57 28.87 31.80 31.85 
Niger 28.89 1562.86 29.48 27.57 29.56 
Sierra Leone 28.76 549.22 28.57 28.60 29.64 
Madagascar 28.72 2504.63 25.52 30.59 29.78 
Mozambique 28.50 2624.31 26.74 29.55 29.35 
Central African Republic 26.72 530.25 22.59 28.74 26.94 
Tanzania 25.85 6102.73 23.27 27.72 27.72 
Rwanda 25.37 1427.05 21.40 27.81 26.93 
Ethiopia 24.44 7254.16 27.72 6.98 15.93 
Guinea 23.92 1133.06 24.00 22.96 24.61 
Guinea-Bissau 23.44 195.79 23.46 22.56 24.39 
Uganda 23.09 3971.72 22.97 22.43 24.07 
Burkina Faso 23.00 2029.72 23.17 21.99 24.03 
Togo 22.38 710.88 23.56 19.44 22.65 
Mali 21.82 2055.86 21.30 21.80 23.49 
Nepal 21.05 3370.83 22.94 16.45 20.91 
Haiti 20.64 1369.30 12.61 24.07 20.09 
Bangladesh 20.23 20300.09 21.30 18.30 22.28 
Benin 16.96 1112.08 17.37 15.34 18.35 
Chad 15.62 1334.33 15.26 14.75 16.86 
Timor-Leste 15.34 134.20 18.48 7.43 14.87 
Comoros 14.82 80.19 10.25 16.93 14.98 
Gambia, The 14.57 153.03 15.21 11.95 14.76 
Kenya 12.14 3908.89 11.30 10.99 12.30 
Nigeria 6.74 13272.04 0 12.27 8.40 
Cambodia 6.44 723.57 12.12 0 1.45 
Zambia 5.25 850.02 0 11.97 5.13 
Pakistan 2.07 3664.81 9.77 0 0 
Lao PDR 0.72 51.69 4.91 0 0 
Lesotho 0 0 0 0.87 0 
India 0 0 0 0 0 
Senegal 0 0 0 0 0 
Papua New Guinea 0 0 0 0 0 
Mauritania 0 0 0 0 0 
Cote d'Ivoire 0 0 0 0 0 
Tajikistan 0 0 0 0 0 
Sao Tome and Principe 0 0 0 0 0 
Yemen, Rep. 0 0 0 0 0 
Vietnam 0 0 0 0 0 
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Ghana 0 0 0 0 0 
Sudan 0 0 0 0 0 
Cameroon 0 0 0 0 0 
Congo, Rep. 0 0 0 0 0 
Kyrgyz Republic 0 0 0 0 0 
Nicaragua 0 0 0 0 0 
Philippines 0 0 0 0 0 
Swaziland 0 0 0 0 0 
Indonesia 0 0 0 0 0 
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 0 0 0 0 0 
Angola 0 0 0 0 0 
Honduras 0 0 0 0 0 
Bhutan 0 0 0 0 0 
Bolivia 0 0 0 0 0 
Georgia 0 0 0 0 0 
Sri Lanka 0 0 0 0 0 
Guatemala 0 0 0 0 0 
Namibia 0 0 0 0 0 
Cape Verde 0 0 0 0 0 
Iraq 0 0 0 0 0 
China 0 0 0 0 0 
Belize 0 0 0 0 0 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0 0 0 0 0 
Fiji 0 0 0 0 0 
Guyana 0 0 0 0 0 
Paraguay 0 0 0 0 0 
St. Lucia 0 0 0 0 0 
Morocco 0 0 0 0 0 
South Africa 0 0 0 0 0 
Moldova 0 0 0 0 0 
Armenia 0 0 0 0 0 
El Salvador 0 0 0 0 0 
Botswana 0 0 0 0 0 
Colombia 0 0 0 0 0 
Ecuador 0 0 0 0 0 
Algeria 0 0 0 0 0 
Peru 0 0 0 0 0 
Syrian Arab Republic 0 0 0 0 0 
Suriname 0 0 0 0 0 
Dominican Republic 0 0 0 0 0 
Panama 0 0 0 0 0 
Gabon 0 0 0 0 0 
Tunisia 0 0 0 0 0 
Albania 0 0 0 0 0 
Thailand 0 0 0 0 0 
Brazil 0 0 0 0 0 
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Maldives 0 0 0 0 0 
Macedonia, FYR 0 0 0 0 0 
Jamaica 0 0 0 0 0 
Venezuela, RB 0 0 0 0 0 
Costa Rica 0 0 0 0 0 
Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 
Jordan 0 0 0 0 0 
Azerbaijan 0 0 0 0 0 
Turkey 0 0 0 0 0 
Argentina 0 0 0 0 0 
Turkmenistan 0 0 0 0 0 
Malaysia 0 0 0 0 0 
Seychelles 0 0 0 0 0 
Chile 0 0 0 0 0 
Uruguay 0 0 0 0 0 
Serbia 0 0 0 0 0 
Kazakhstan 0 0 0 0 0 
Trinidad and Tobago 0 0 0 0 0 
Montenegro 0 0 0 0 0 
Ukraine 0 0 0 0 0 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0 0 0 0 0 
Belarus 0 0 0 0 0 
Croatia 0 0 0 0 0 
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